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COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION OF CONTRACTS
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than ten years, a debate has been raging in copyright
law over the enforceability of contractual license agreements that alter
the “delicate balance” of rights that the Copyright Act strikes between
owners and users of works of authorship.1  The debate initially fo-
cused primarily on so-called “shrinkwrap licenses” that accompanied
computer software.  Owners of copyrighted software were using the
shrinkwrap licenses to prohibit licensees from using the software in
ways that were permitted—even encouraged—by the Copyright Act,
including reverse engineering the software to learn how it works and
copying the software for archival and other purposes.2  Since then,
technology has improved, facilitating the formation of contracts to
cover many uses previously governed by copyright.  Today, people
contract away statutory rights—including their rights to use un-
copyrighted public domain material as well as their fair use rights—
with a single click of the mouse.  This contract regime threatens to
supplant a sizeable portion of the copyright regime.
Copyright  2008 by Christina Bohannan.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.  The author would
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1. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing
whether the terms of a software license are preempted by the Copyright Act); Nat’l Car
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Mark A.
Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) [herein-
after Lemley, Intellectual Property] (discussing the growing importance of contract law, as
opposed to the Copyright Act, in the allocation of rights in computer software); David
Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999) (address-
ing the ways contract law is interacting and interfering with rights under the Copyright Act
and suggesting ways to regulate contracts dealing with software licensing); Maureen A.
O’Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of
Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995) (same); Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Comment,
Contract and Copyright Are Not at War: A Reply to “The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand,”
87 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1999) (same).
This debate continues today. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 953 (2005) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright]; Kathleen K.
Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and Constitutional Preemption of Contract-Based
Claims, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 83, 84 (2006).
2. See Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 1241–48 (discussing the uses and R
contents of shrinkwrap licenses).
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The balance of rights provided in the Copyright Act is necessary
to copyright’s purpose of fostering the creation and dissemination of
expression.  To achieve its purpose, copyright law must foster all kinds
of expression, old as well as new, by owners as well as users.  Thus,
license agreements that tip the balance of rights to favor licensors are
often contrary to copyright policy.
Many copyright scholars have argued that these contractual li-
censes should not be enforced.  Initially, they argued that these li-
censes, particularly unbargained-for shrinkwrap licenses, should be
deemed invalid contracts under ordinary contract law.3  Around that
time, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was being updated to
reflect the business realities of contracting in the digital age.4  One
major revision was the addition of Article 2B, which provided that
shrinkwrap licenses and other form agreements were presumptively
enforceable despite the fact that they lacked traditional forms of as-
sent to their terms.5  Courts now routinely reject the position that
shrinkwrap and other licenses should be held invalid as a matter of
contract law.6
Copyright scholars next turned to preemption doctrine, arguing
that the Copyright Act should preempt contractual licenses that alter
the Act’s “delicate balance” of rights between owners and users.7
Here, too, courts have been unreceptive.  Although courts frequently
have held that the Copyright Act preempts non-contract state law
claims ranging from unfair competition and misappropriation to
rights of publicity, they are clearly uncomfortable preempting con-
tract claims.8  Courts recognize that contracts are different from both
federal copyrights and other state law claims in ways that matter in
preemption analysis.  Preemption analysis focuses on conflicts be-
tween federal law and state-imposed obligations, whereas contracts re-
flect private ordering.  Moreover, the Copyright Act expressly allows
contracts for certain purposes.9  Indeed, the efficacy of the Act as a
3. See, e.g., id. at 1240; Nimmer et al., supra note 1, at 19; Wolfson, supra note 1, at 79. R
4. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. R
5. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. R
6. See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451–53 (stating that refusing to enforce these contracts
would force modern business transactions to return to the “horse-and-buggy age”).
7. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 541–51. R
8. See infra Part III.A.1.a.
9. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2000) (allowing transfer of copyright ownership by
written agreement or by operation of law); id. § 101 (defining “work made for hire” as a
work falling within enumerated categories “if the parties expressly agree in a written instru-
ment signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire”).
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whole depends on the ability of copyright owners to contract with
others to make the most of their copyrights.
As a result, courts virtually never preempt these contracts, no
matter how much their terms conflict with the Act’s provisions.
Courts reason that because contracts contain an element of agree-
ment and bind only those in privity, contract claims are qualitatively
different from copyright claims.10  Meanwhile, scholars are equally
categorical in their opposing view, reasoning that contract claims can
impede the objectives of federal law just as other state law claims can.
Thus, they conclude that contract claims should almost always be pre-
empted where the terms of the contract differ from the terms of the
Copyright Act.11
Although courts and scholars disagree over preemption, they
agree that copyright law needs a remedy for contractual overreaching.
For instance, some courts have suggested that the evolving doctrine of
copyright misuse might provide a defense where the copyright owner
uses a contract to expand the copyright “monopoly” beyond the scope
provided by the Copyright Act.12  But misuse is no panacea for harms
to copyright or competition policy arising from license agreements.
Oftentimes, a copyright license agreement is deemed to constitute
misuse only where it comes close to being an antitrust violation, such
as where the agreement imposes an unlawful tying arrangement.13  Al-
though some courts have indicated their willingness to free misuse
from antitrust principles,14 they must be careful to restrain it.  Misuse
is a powerful remedy for contractual overreaching.  It invalidates not
only the particular contract, but the entire copyright as well for as
long as the misuse continues.15  Indeed, even infringers who are not
parties to the contract can raise misuse as a defense in a copyright
infringement suit.16
Thus, while misuse occupies an important role in copyright, it is
frequently not an appropriate remedy for contractual overreaching.
Preemption is a more appropriate remedy in many cases because it
10. See infra Part III.A.1.a.
11. See infra Part III.A.1.b.
12. See, e.g., Assessm’t Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 646–47 (7th
Cir. 2003); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Li-
censing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 153–55 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Beyond Preemption].
13. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 3.4b1 (Supp. 2006).
14. Id. § 3.4b1 & nn.15–15.1.
15. JAMES B. KOBAK, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE: LICENSING AND LITIGATION 216
(2000).
16. See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copy-
right Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 867
(2000).
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prevents enforcement of license agreements that are contrary to copy-
right policy without invalidating the copyright as a whole.17  Unfortu-
nately, preemption doctrine is under-utilized because no coherent
model of preemption accommodates both the interest in enforcing
contracts as well as the interest in enforcing copyright policy.
This Article argues that both courts and scholars are wrong in
their categorical approaches to preemption of contracts under the
Copyright Act, and proposes an intermediate approach that recog-
nizes the importance of both contract rights and federal policy in pre-
emption analysis.  First, it argues that both courts and scholars have
misapplied preemption law to breach of contract claims.  Although
the two sides tend to favor opposite results, they take equally categori-
cal approaches.18  Categorical approaches to the issue of contract pre-
emption are antithetical to preemption law.  Under either express or
implied preemption, courts must consider whether a particular state
law claim interferes with the purpose of the federal statute.  This pre-
emption analysis turns not on the label of state law claim under con-
sideration, but on close examination of the legal and factual details of
a particular case.
Second, the reason this issue has been analyzed incorrectly is that
preemption law seems ill-suited to contract claims.  Ordinarily, pre-
emption cases are concerned with whether a state regulatory scheme
is likely to supplant a federal scheme.  In cases dealing with preemp-
tion of contracts, however, that is not ordinarily the issue.  State law is
necessary to enforce contracts, but the obligations are voluntarily as-
sumed.  Thus, the issue is really whether individuals should be able to
contract away rights granted by the federal Copyright Act.  Accord-
ingly, I argue that in analyzing the Copyright Act’s preemption of con-
tracts, courts should draw more from the law related to contractual
waiver of statutory rights.  This body of law governs the extent to
which individual waivers of statutory rights are enforceable and ap-
plies to all kinds of state and federal statutes.19
Third, the Article proposes a new model for addressing copyright
preemption of contracts based on insights from waiver doctrine.
Waiver doctrine holds a contractual waiver enforceable if it (1) is clear
and unmistakable, and (2) purports to waive statutory rights under
17. Cf. Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 960–61 (2007) (arguing that in
cases involving contractual overreaching by an intellectual property holder rising to “trans-
actional misuse,” federal intellectual property law should preempt the offensive contract
but should not invalidate the underlying right).
18. See infra Part III.A.1.
19. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. R
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the Copyright Act that protect individual rather than public inter-
ests.20  If courts integrate these requirements from waiver doctrine
into contract preemption analysis, the analysis will be more consistent
with preemption law generally and will find the proper balance be-
tween freedom of contract and federal copyright policy.
The first waiver requirement encourages informed contracting
and protects federal copyright policy by maintaining the Copyright
Act’s balance of rights unless parties clearly intend to strike a different
balance for themselves.  The second requirement protects freedom of
contract and federal copyright policy by enforcing contracts that do
not contravene statutory purpose and preempting those that do.
Where a statutory right is intended to benefit an individual, courts
should treat it as a default right that parties may contract around.
Thus, for example, contractual promises not to resell or make archival
copies of a work ordinarily should not be preempted.  On the other
hand, where the right is intended to benefit the public, individuals
ordinarily should not be able to waive it.  The right is not theirs to give
away, and, if enforced, the waiver could interfere with the purpose of
the federal statute.  For instance, a contractual promise not to use
public domain material or to make fair use of copyrighted material
affects copyright policy intended for protection of the public.  Accord-
ingly, unless the court determines that allowing individual waivers will
somehow effectuate the Copyright Act’s statutory purpose in the ag-
gregate, contracts containing such waivers should be preempted.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Contract Validity
The debate over the enforceability of contract licenses began
around the time that the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was in the process of revising the
U.C.C.21  Article 2B was added to the U.C.C. to provide answers to
new questions arising in digital commerce.  As such, it governs
software licenses, electronic agreements, and other information
transactions.22
Recognizing the business realities of contracting in the informa-
tion age, Article 2B exempts such contracts from the U.C.C.’s general
20. See infra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. R
21. See Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 1240; Nimmer et al., supra note 1, at R
21–22; Wolfson, supra note 1, at 79–80. R
22. U.C.C. § 2B-103 cmt. 2 (Draft 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
zrchives/ulc/ucc2b/2b299.htm.
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requirements for contract formation and enforceability and provides
specific rules for these new contracts.  In particular, it provides that
shrinkwrap licenses and other form agreements are enforceable even
where they lack traditional forms of assent to their terms.  Under Arti-
cle 2B, a party manifests assent to the terms of a standard license by
engaging in conduct that the license says constitutes acceptance.23
Thus, licensees might accept the terms of a license by opening the
box and using the software, or perhaps even by failing to return the
opened software to the vendor.
Because such agreements often prohibit licensees from using the
underlying software or other work in ways that are privileged by the
Copyright Act, some commentators objected to Article 2B’s rules that
made these agreements presumptively enforceable contracts.  They ar-
gued that the agreements governed by Article 2B were inconsistent
with the “delicate balance” that the Copyright Act creates between
owners and users. Thus, they urged that the proposed Article 2B
should be amended to provide that agreements that alter the Copy-
right Act’s balance of rights are unenforceable.24
The NCCUSL did not agree, and with good reason.  In a nutshell,
the proposed amendments conflated issues of contract formation with
issues of federal preemption.  Article 2B merely provided for the en-
forceability of agreements as a matter of contract law.  Indeed, it has
always declared unenforceable any provisions that are preempted by
federal law.25  Although some commentators argued that this pur-
ported neutrality on the preemption issue did not do enough to pro-
tect federal copyright policy,26 it seems unrealistic to believe that a
commission that undertook to rewrite the U.C.C. would also take on
federal preemption.  In any event, the NCCUSL completed its work
on Article 2B without the suggested amendments.  The resulting
23. Id. § 2B-203.
24. For instance, Professor Mark Lemley argued that Article 2B “should be revised so
that it does not enforce unbargained shrinkwrap license provisions that reduce or elimi-
nate the rights granted to licensees by the federal intellectual property laws.”  Lemley,
Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 1264.  He argued that this categorical approach actually R
“avoids the question of preemption” altogether because it “ensur[es] that shrinkwrap li-
censes do not contradict federal intellectual property law.” Id.  David Nimmer, author of a
leading copyright treatise, similarly argued that “[a]ttempts to alter the ‘delicate balance’
through contract should fail,” and that “if Article 2B is to be enacted, it must proscribe
contracting practices that seek to extend copyright protection beyond its current scope.”
Nimmer et al., supra note 1, at 19. R
25. U.C.C. § 2B-105 (Draft 1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/zrchives/
ulc/ucc2b/2b299.htm.
26. See Nimmer et al., supra note 1, at 69–71 (arguing that Article 2B’s purported neu- R
trality presumptively validates provisions which are impermissibly in favor of proprietors).
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model statute was renamed the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA).27  It has since been enacted into law in at
least two jurisdictions.28
Some issues remain with regard to the validity of shrinkwrap li-
censes and similar agreements.  Courts continue to address arguments
that these agreements should be treated as unconscionable contracts
of adhesion, or that, at the least, they should not be given as much
deference as negotiated contracts.  For the most part, however, courts
uphold these contracts under the UCITA or other state contract law.
As a result, courts have turned their attention to the issue of preemp-
tion under the federal Copyright Act.
B. Copyright Act Preemption of State Law Claims
There are two primary ways that a federal statute might preempt
a state law claim.  First, express preemption would hold a state law
claim unenforceable if it meets the requirements of an express pre-
emption clause of a federal statute.  Second, implied preemption
would hold a state law claim unenforceable under the Supremacy
Clause if state enforcement of the claim interferes with the objectives
of the federal statute.29
Prior to passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, the Supreme Court
held in Goldstein v. California that state law claims could co-exist with
federal copyright law so long as they did not interfere with copyright’s
27. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (2002), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm.
28. UCITA was adopted in Virginia and Maryland in 2000. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-
501.1 to -509.2 (Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-101 to -816 (2000).
29. There are three types of implied preemption.  First, “field preemption” occurs
where the federal statutory scheme is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  Second, “conflict preemption” occurs where conflicting
requirements of federal and state law make it impossible to comply with both. See Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963).  Third, “interference
preemption” occurs where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941).
In the context of the Copyright Act, field preemption is not applicable to contract
claims.  The Act specifically requires or encourages authors to enter into contracts for
certain purposes. See supra note 9.  Moreover, contracts are necessary to allow copyright R
owners to make the most of their rights.  It also is unlikely that conflict preemption applies
under the Copyright Act, because conflict preemption applies only where a state law re-
quires something that the federal law prohibits, or vice versa, and such instances are rare.
This Article focuses on the two types of preemption most relevant to the Copyright Act:
express preemption and implied preemption based on interference with federal statutory
objectives.
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statutory purpose.30  Thus, the Court explained that under the
Supremacy Clause, “a conflict would develop if a State attempted to
protect that which Congress intended to be free from restraint or to
free that which Congress had protected.”31  On the other hand,
“where Congress determines that neither federal protection nor free-
dom from restraint is required by the national interest, . . . state pro-
tection would not then conflict with federal action . . . .”32
Within a few years after Goldstein, Congress added an express pre-
emption clause in the 1976 Copyright Act. Section 301(a) describes
when the Act preempts rights granted by state statute or common law.
It states:
[A]ll legal and equitable rights that are equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed
in a tangible medium of expression and come within the sub-
ject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103 . . . are governed exclusively by this title.  Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.33
While courts now frequently address express preemption under
Section 301 of the Copyright Act, they typically do not address implied
preemption as the Goldstein Court did prior to the 1976 Act.  Presuma-
bly, courts believe that because Congress included a specific preemp-
tion clause in the Act, that clause delineates fully the preemptive
effect of the statute.
This approach to preemption is probably incorrect.  Preemption
of state law that interferes with federal law objectives is required by
constitutional mandate: “under the Supremacy Clause, from which
our pre-emption doctrine is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly
within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is con-
trary to federal law, must yield.’”34  Thus, if a state law interferes with a
federal statute’s purpose, it should be preempted even if it does not
fall within the parameters of an express preemption clause.
30. 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that the federal Copyright Act did not preempt Cali-
fornia statute criminalizing piracy of sound recordings where the Copyright Act did not at
the time accord copyright protection for record piracy).
31. Id. at 559.
32. Id.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
34. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
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In any event, it probably does not matter whether courts apply
express or implied preemption, because these categories are not as
distinct as they seem.35  The Supreme Court has made it abundantly
clear that in both express and implied preemption, every preemption
case turns on congressional purpose.36  In implied preemption cases,
the inquiry depends directly on whether state law impedes the federal
statutory purpose, which requires courts to examine the language,
structure, and history of the statute.  In express preemption cases,
courts must rely on congressional purpose or intent in order to inter-
pret the language of preemption clauses, and such language is rarely
clear about the scope of preemption.
Accordingly, the approach proposed in this Article does not rely
exclusively on express preemption or implied preemption but rather
assumes that it makes little difference whether courts apply express
preemption, implied preemption, or both under the Copyright Act.
So long as courts decide preemption cases based on the effect state
law claims have on statutory purpose, they should be able to reach the
right result.
It is clear that in interpreting the express preemption clause of
the Copyright Act, courts consider the purpose of the Act and the
extent to which state law claims will impede that purpose.37  In deter-
mining whether a particular state law right is preempted under Sec-
tion 301, courts have applied a two-part test.  A state law right is
preempted if: (1) the subject matter of the state law claim is within the
subject matter of federal copyright (subject matter requirement); and
(2) the right asserted under state law is equivalent to the exclusive
rights granted to copyright holders by federal copyright (equivalence
requirement).38
35. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2.1, at 377 (2d ed. 2002) (noting
that implied and express preemption ultimately require very similar analysis, despite being
considered two different categories); see also, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the
Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEG.
35, 40 (1996) (arguing that there is little difference between express and implied preemp-
tion); O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 535 (conducting implied constitutional preemption anal- R
ysis of copyright license terms and concluding that “the inquiry would proceed in the same
manner as noted [in express preemption analysis] under § 301 and should result in the
same finding”).
36. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (stating that “‘[t]he purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case”) (quoting Retail Clerks
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 541–42 (2001) (same); Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (same).
37. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. R
38. See, e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001); Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997); Ehat v. Tanner, 780
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Courts have considered a wide variety of state law claims under
this test.  Such claims involve rights of privacy, rights of publicity, un-
fair competition, trade secrets, conversion of personal property, and
misappropriation, among other things.39  Although the type of claim
being challenged is important, courts rarely rule categorically on pre-
emption based on the label of the state law claim.  Each of these
claims requires proof of unique elements that are not, at least ostensi-
bly, identical to the elements of a copyright infringement claim under
the federal Copyright Act.  Moreover, the facts giving rise to these
claims can vary significantly.
Thus, in conducting preemption analysis under Section 301,
courts are attentive to both the legal and factual details of the state law
claims.  The driving consideration is the extent to which the claim
interferes with or supplants the purpose of the Copyright Act.
With regard to the subject matter requirement for preemption,
most of the courts that have addressed the question have held that the
scope of the Copyright Act’s subject matter for preemption purposes
may extend to subject matter that is not copyrightable under the
Act.40  Thus, courts have rejected formalistic arguments that the scope
of subject matter preempted by the Copyright Act should be coexten-
sive with the scope of subject matter that is copyrightable under the
Act.  Rather, courts have reasoned that state law protection of un-
copyrightable subject matter can interfere with the Act’s purpose in
designating the boundary between what should be protected and what
should remain in the public domain.
For instance, Section 102(b) provides that copyright protection
does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in [a]
work.”41  With this section, the 1976 Act codified the well-established
idea/expression dichotomy in which expression embodying ideas is
copyrightable while the underlying ideas are not.  The purpose of this
limitation on copyrightability is to ensure that building-block ideas re-
F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1985); Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195,
199–200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
39. See generally 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01
(2007).
40. See Wrench, 256 F.3d at 455 (collecting casese and saying “[w]e join our sister cir-
cuits in holding that the scope of the Copyright Act’s subject matter is broader than the
scope of the Act’s protections”); see also United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he shadow actually cast by the [Copy-
right] Act’s preemption is notably broader than the wing of its protection.”).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
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main in the public domain for all to use.42  Thus, courts have held
that the Act preempts state law claims prohibiting the use of un-
copyrightable ideas that underlie copyrightable expression.
“[O]therwise ‘states would be free to expand the perimeters of copy-
right protection to their own liking, on the theory that preemption
would be no bar to state protection of material not meeting federal
statutory standards.’”43  Although this conclusion regarding the Copy-
right Act’s preemptive scope is based on an interpretation of the Act’s
express preemption clause, it mirrors Goldstein’s conclusion that im-
plied preemption under the Supremacy Clause occurs where state law
“attempt[s] to protect that which Congress intended to be free from
restraint.”44
Even regarding subject matter traditionally protected by the
states, courts pick and choose which subject matter is preempted
based on the extent to which the claim will affect the efficacy of fed-
eral copyright law.  Right of publicity claims for misappropriation of a
celebrity’s voice offer a good example.
Vocal performances involve both copyrightable subject matter
such as the song itself, and uncopyrightable subject matter, such as
the performer’s voice.  Many courts have held that right of publicity
claims are not preempted where the plaintiff argues that the defen-
dant has imitated a celebrity’s voice, because a voice is not copyright-
able subject matter.45  Yet, courts have reached a different result
where a plaintiff argues that the defendant misappropriated her voice
by reproducing a recording of the plaintiff’s performance of a song.
Because songs are copyrightable subject matter, courts have pre-
empted such claims where the defendant reproduced the song with-
out the plaintiff performer’s consent but with the consent of the
owner of the copyright in the song.46
42. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating that the “idea/expression
dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copy-
right Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s ex-
pression” (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
43. Wrench, 256 F.3d at 455 (quoting Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200).
44. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973).
45. E.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that
where a professional “sound alike” imitated Bette Midler’s voice, singing one of her hit
songs without her permission, the Copyright Act did not preempt a voice misappropriation
claim under California law, as it failed the subject matter requirement of the preemption
test).
46. E.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that the Copyright Act preempted the plaintiff’s claims of misappropriation of her
name and voice where Sony, with the permission of the plaintiff’s agent, used a sample of
the plaintiff’s prior work without compensating or properly crediting the plaintiff).
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The Ninth Circuit recently explained the distinction between dif-
ferent right of publicity claims: “[a]lthough California law recognizes
an assertable interest in the publicity associated with one’s voice, we
think it is clear that federal copyright law preempts a claim alleging
misappropriation of one’s voice when the entirety of the allegedly mis-
appropriated vocal performance is contained within a copyrighted
medium.”47  The court reasoned that allowing such state law claims
would interfere with the efficacy of the federal Act:
Were we to conclude that [the plaintiff’s] voice misappropri-
ation claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act, then
virtually every use of a copyrighted sound recording would
infringe upon the original performer’s right of publicity. . . .
It is hard to imagine how a copyright would remain meaning-
ful if its licensees were potentially subject to suit from any
performer anytime the copyrighted material was used.48
Courts focus on the effect state law claims would have on the
Act’s statutory purpose when applying the second requirement of the
preemption test as well.  Under this requirement, preemption occurs
only if the rights asserted in the state law claim are “equivalent” to
exclusive rights within the general scope of the Copyright Act.49  In
determining whether a state law claim is “equivalent” to a federal cop-
yright infringement action, many circuits have applied the “extra ele-
ment” test.50  Under this test, the state law claim is equivalent to a
federal copyright infringement action if it contains no extra elements
beyond those required to show copyright infringement.51
The extra-element test has been criticized heavily for providing
little guidance to courts on the issue of equivalence.  Because there is
always some variation between the state law claim and a copyright in-
fringement claim, a court could always find “some difference, however
small, that is the ‘extra element’ needed to avoid preemption.”52  In-
deed, many commentators agree that “courts seem to first decide in-
47. Id. at 1141.
48. Id. at 1145.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
50. E.g., Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2003); Wrench LLC v.
Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001); Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer
Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993); Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gard-
ner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy,
Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
51. See, e.g., Carson, 344 F.3d at 456–57.
52. Schuyler Moore, Straightening Out Copyright Preemption, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 201,
204 (2002).
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dependently whether or not they think preemption should apply,”53
and then use the extra-element test to reach that conclusion.54
It is unclear whether courts have effectively jettisoned the extra-
element test in favor of considering equivalence directly, or instead
have begun to apply the extra-element test in a more meaningful way.
What is clear is that, as with the subject matter requirement, courts do
not interpret the equivalence requirement of the express preemption
clause in a superficial or overly technical manner.  Rather, consistent
with preemption law generally, courts really focus on the extent to
which state law claims will affect the accomplishment of copyright’s
purpose.
Consistent with this emphasis on purpose, the Second Circuit has
said that it “take[s] a restrictive view of what extra elements transform
an otherwise equivalent claim into one that is qualitatively different
from a copyright infringement claim,”55 and other circuits take an
equally hard look at these elements.  Courts attempt to sort out which
extra elements are merely “illusory,”56 and which ones actually
“change[ ] the nature” of the claim,57 or make the claim “qualitatively
different” from a copyright infringement claim.58  Thus, courts rou-
tinely find additional elements such as awareness, intent, or unjust
enrichment are insufficient to survive preemption.59  Moreover, sev-
53. Id.
54. See Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 288 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting MARSHALL LEAF-
FER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 11.07(C) (4th ed. 2005)).
55. Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004).
56. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[C]laims
might be preempted whose extra elements are illusory . . . .”).
57. Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 301 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Laws v.
Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The extra element must
transform the nature of the action.”).
58. See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th
Cir. 1993) (concluding that a “contractual restriction” constituted an extra element).
59. See Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306 (“Like the elements of awareness or intent, the en-
richment element here limits the scope of the claim but leaves its fundamental nature
unaltered.”); Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 637–38 (6th
Cir. 2001) (finding an unjust enrichment claim equivalent to a copyright infringement
claim); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1985) (same); see also NIMMER & NIM-
MER, supra note 39, § 1.01 [B][1][g], at 1–51 (same). R
Only claims requiring clearly different elements, such as control over tangible prop-
erty (as in conversion) or breach of a confidential relationship or fiduciary duty (as in
trade secret misappropriation), routinely survive copyright preemption analysis.  See, e.g.,
Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that under the “extra
element” test, action for conversion of physical property under Texas law was not pre-
empted because it requires “a showing of an ‘unauthorized and wrongful assumption and
exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another, to the exclusion
of or inconsistent with the owner’s rights’” (quoting Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, 474 S.W.2d
444, 447 (Tex. 1971))); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d
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eral courts have found unfair competition claims and right of public-
ity claims equivalent to copyright claims (and therefore preempted),
despite extra elements such as misappropriation for commercial
advantage.60
III. ANALYSIS
A. Copyright Act Preemption of Contracts
When courts consider preemption of breach of contract claims,
their analysis is much more categorical than their analysis of preemp-
tion of other state law claims.  In breach of contract cases, a licensor of
a work of authorship typically licenses use of the work on terms less
favorable to the licensee than the Copyright Act provides.  For in-
stance, the contract might provide that the licensee may use copy-
rightable elements of the work on the condition that she will refrain
from using uncopyrightable elements of the work.  Alternatively, the
contract might require payment for use of an uncopyrightable work,
or prohibit the licensee from using the work in a way that would be a
non-infringing fair use of the work under the Act. Although these con-
tract claims vary widely, and although many of them apparently con-
flict with provisions of the Copyright Act, courts have uniformly held
that the Act does not preempt breach of contract claims.
The Copyright Act’s preemption clause does not specifically ad-
dress whether breach of contract claims should be preempted and
does not distinguish between contract claims and other state law
claims with regard to preemption.61  Courts simply attempt to apply to
contract claims the same two-prong preemption test that they apply to
Cir. 1992) (“The defendant’s breach of duty is the gravamen of . . . trade secret claims, and
supplies the ‘extra element’ that qualitatively distinguishes such trade secret causes of ac-
tion from claims for copyright infringement that are based solely upon copying.”); see also
Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306 (expressing that “a state law claim is qualitatively different if it
requires such elements as breach of fiduciary duty . . . or possession and control of
chattels”).
60. See, e.g., Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144 (stating that “[t]he mere presence of an additional
element [of ‘commercial use’] is not enough to qualitatively distinguish [plaintiff’s] right
of publicity claim from a claim in copyright,” because “[a]lthough the elements of [plain-
tiff’s] state law claims may not be identical to the elements in a copyright action, the under-
lying nature of [plaintiff’s] state law claims is part and parcel of a copyright claim”); Alcatel
USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 789 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that although a
state law claim for unfair competition by misappropriation required a showing of a substan-
tial investment in the product and defendant’s use of the product in competition with the
plaintiff, these elements are often present in copyright claims and do not render the state
law claim qualitatively different than a copyright claim).
61. Although there is some legislative history on the issue, it is subject to conflicting
interpretations and is currently ignored by courts.  This history relates to revisions of Sec-
tion 301(b), which provides:
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non-contract state law claims.  Courts have little or no difficulty apply-
ing the subject matter requirement to contract claims in the same
case-by-case manner that they apply it to other state law claims.  Courts
have a great deal of difficulty, however, in applying the equivalence
requirement in this way.
There are three doctrinal approaches to determining whether a
contract claim is equivalent to a copyright claim and therefore pre-
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to . . . subject matter that does not come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, includ-
ing works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”
17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2000).  As this section was originally drafted, subsection 3 included
examples of state law claims that would not be preempted.  Breach of contract actions were
listed as one of the examples of claims not preempted.  H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. (1966),
reprinted in IV THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTI-
CAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, at 27 (Alan Latman &
James F. Lightstone eds., 1983).  The committee report from the House of Representatives
that accompanied the bill said that these examples were “intended to illustrate rights and
remedies that are different in nature from the rights comprised in a copyright and that
may continue to be protected under State common law or statute.” H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at
132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.  Moreover, the report stated that
“[n]othing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to contract with each other and
to sue for breaches of contract.” Id.
The list of examples, including breach of contract actions, was deleted from the final
version of Section 301.  There is some indication in the legislative history that the examples
were omitted because the Justice Department was concerned that a different example,
misappropriation actions, should not be included.  It is not clear, however, that this was the
only reason for the deletion. See Nat’l Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 433–34 & n.5 (discussing
the legislative history of Section 301(b)(3)).  United States Representative Seiberling rec-
ommended that the amendment delete the examples.  He stated that his amendment was
“intended to save the ‘Federal preemption’ of State law section, which is section 301 of the
bill, from being inadvertently nullified because of the inclusion of certain examples in the
exemptions from preemption.”  122 CONG. REC. H32015 (1976).  He went on to say that
the Justice Department supported the amendment because of its concern about the doc-
trine of misappropriation. Id.
Courts have been mixed on how to interpret this legislative history.  At least one court
interpreted the inclusion and subsequent deletion of contract actions to mean that Con-
gress changed its mind and decided that such actions should be preempted after all. See
Wolff v. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that
Congress purposefully removed the section of the statute that would have created a “safe
harbor” for those claims).  Another court disagreed with that interpretation, concluding
that the original inclusion of contract actions as an example of actions that are not pre-
empted, coupled with evidence that the reason for the deletion related to a different exam-
ple, reflects a “congressional intent not to preempt breach of contract actions.”  Nat’l Car
Rental, 991 F.2d at 433–34.  Nimmer agrees with this view. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 39, at 1–22 (discussing the court’s finding in National Car Rental); see also O’Rourke, R
supra note 1, at 517–21 (discussing National Car Rental’s rejection of Wolff’s interpretation R
of the legislative history of § 301(b)).
Given its ambiguity, the legislative history of Section 301(b) is simply not helpful to
courts in determining whether the Copyright Act preempts a given contract.  Indeed, this
legislative history is rarely cited by courts any longer.
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empted.  The first approach holds that a contract right is simply not
equivalent to a copyright because it reflects private ordering and ap-
plies only to those in privity.  Put another way, the mutual promise
required to make a contract is itself an “extra element” that defeats
preemption.62  This categorical approach to contract preemption
cases comes, in large part, from Judge Easterbrook’s decision in ProCD
v. Zeidenberg.63
The second approach is almost as categorical as the first, but ar-
gues in favor of contract preemption.  This view, proposed by a num-
ber of copyright scholars, argues that contracts that upset the delicate
balance struck by the Copyright Act should be preempted because
they stand in the way of the federal statutory objectives.
The third approach purports to be a more nuanced extra-ele-
ment test.  Under this approach, courts hold that a contract claim is
equivalent to a copyright claim where the licensee promises merely to
refrain from infringing exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act.
If the contract includes a promise to do (or to refrain from doing)
anything else, it is not equivalent.  For instance, one court has held
that a contractual promise to pay for the use of a work is an extra
element that allows the contract to survive preemption.
The following sections evaluate in more detail the categorical and
extra-element approaches to contract preemption.
1. Categorical Approaches to Contract Preemption
a. ProCD and the “Contracts Are Different” Approach
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit is probably the
most notable proponent of the view that “a simple two-party contract
is not ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright’” and therefore should not be preempted.64  He
first articulated this view in ProCD in 1996.65
62. Courts considering equivalence directly state that a contract claim is qualitatively
different from a copyright infringement claim because a contract right binds only those in
contractual privity. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that “[a] copyright is a right against the world,” whereas “contracts do not create
‘exclusive rights’”).  Similarly, courts applying the extra-element test of equivalence say
that the requirement of a bargained-for exchange constitutes an extra element that distin-
guishes the contract right from a copyright. See, e.g., Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rub-
ber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that the contract promise made by the
plaintiff constituted an additional element and was therefore not preempted).
63. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447.
64. Id. at 1455.
65. Id.
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In ProCD, the plaintiff had created an uncopyrightable database
of information including telephone numbers and zip codes.  He dis-
tributed the same database with at least two different shrinkwrap li-
censes.  Under one contract, the buyer would pay a lower price but
would be restricted to personal use.  Under another contract, the
buyer would pay a higher price but would be permitted to use the
database commercially.  The defendant bought the version allowing
only personal use, and then used it for commercial purposes.66
The plaintiff sued for breach of contract.  The defendant argued
first that the shrinkwrap license was unenforceable as a matter of con-
tract law under the U.C.C.  The defendant next argued that even if
the license was valid under contract law, the Copyright Act preempted
its enforcement because it restricted his use of uncopyrightable public
domain information.67  Specifically, it conflicted with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co. that
such telephone entries constituted factual data that could not be pro-
tected by copyright.68
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook first concluded that the
shrinkwrap license was a valid contract under applicable provisions of
the U.C.C.  Because the U.C.C. allows the licensor to invite acceptance
of the license terms in any manner, the court found that a contract
was formed when the licensee opened the product package contain-
ing the license and used the product rather than returning it.69
On the preemption issue, Judge Easterbrook agreed with the dis-
trict judge’s conclusion that ProCD’s data were “within the subject
matter of copyright,” even though the data were uncopyrightable.70
He explained that:
[o]ne function of § 301(a) is to prevent states from giving
special protection to works of authorship that Congress has
decided should be in the public domain, which it can accom-
plish only if “subject matter of copyright” includes all works
of a type covered by sections 102 and 103, even if federal law
does not afford protection to them.71
66. See id. at 1449–50 (describing ProCD’s product, the two versions of its shrinkwrap
licenses, and Zeidenberg’s commercial use of the personal use version).
67. See id. at 1453 (noting that the lower court accepted Zeidenberg’s argument and
held that Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act prevents the enforcement of shrinkwrap
licenses).
68. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991).
69. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452–53.
70. Id. at 1453 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id.
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Judge Easterbrook disagreed with the district court’s conclusion
that the contract rights under dispute were “equivalent” to copyrights,
however.  Thus, he found the copyright claim was not preempted.  He
explained as follows:
Rights “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright” [under section 301] are rights
established by law—rights that restrict the options of persons
who are strangers to the author. . . .  A copyright is a right
against the world.  Contracts, by contrast, generally affect
only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so con-
tracts do not create “exclusive rights.”72
While ProCD held open the possibility that some claims, while
technically falling under “the label ‘contract,’” might nevertheless be
preempted, the court asserted that contracts generally should be en-
forced.73  Several other courts have embraced this view, and ProCD is
generally regarded as the leading case on the issue.74
In a recent essay, Judge Easterbrook attempts to provide a more
nuanced argument for why contracts should not be preempted.75  He
argues that the world is complex, and copyright covers a vast domain
of information.  As a result, it is impossible for the legislature or the
judiciary to predict how legal rules will affect innovation and competi-
tion.  Therefore, it is preferable to let people allocate rights for them-
selves.  He states:
Does anyone really believe that one single allocation of
rights to produce and use works best for movies, records,
books, architectural plans, photographs, software, and so on?
The domain of copyright is vast.  The most anyone can hope
for in a law is to create a framework—that is, to endow au-
thors with a set of property rights—and let people work out
the details for themselves.76
He also asserts that there is nothing special about copyright to
warrant greater regulation or less deference to private ordering than
in other areas of law.  He disputes the proposition that a copyright
72. Id. at 1454.
73. Id. at 1455.
74. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
ProCD for the proposition that state contracts limiting user rights are not preempted by the
Copyright Act); Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001)
(same); see also Olson, supra note 1, at 102 (describing ProCD as “the leading case regarding R
shrinkwrap licensing agreements”).
75. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, supra note 1. R
76. Id. at 961.
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creates a monopoly in any real sense.77  And while he admits that in-
formation is a non-rivalrous good, he argues that copyrights are more
similar to ordinary property rights than many have asserted:
“[A]lthough one can say that property rights in information are social
constructs, so are property rights in cattle.  They set the stage for con-
tracts; they do not prevent contracts.”78
b. Copyright Scholars and the “Delicate Balance” Approach
Judge Easterbrook’s categorical approach to contract preemption
has been criticized heavily.79  Indeed, the attack on ProCD’s approach
to contract preemption began even before ProCD was decided.  Dur-
ing the NCCUSL’s revision of the U.C.C. (which culminated in adop-
tion of the UCITA), it confronted the issue of whether the U.C.C.
should recognize shrinkwrap licenses as valid contracts.80  Many com-
mentators argued that it should not, at least not where the license
limited user rights granted under the Copyright Act.
For example, Professor Mark Lemley weighed the arguments in
favor of freedom of contract against arguments in favor of enforce-
ment of federal copyright policy.81  He noted that the case for enforc-
ing contracts was based on concepts of individual autonomy,
economic efficiency, and protection of party expectations.  On the
other hand, he stated that the case for enforcing federal intellectual
property policy is based on the idea that federal intellectual property
law grants a set of limited rights to intellectual property owners that
“reflects a ‘delicate balance’ between many different interests, and not
all of those interests are represented in licensing contracts.”82  Thus,
he argued that “[e]nforcing such contracts is inefficient because the
contracts do not take into account the full social costs and benefits of
the agreement between two parties.”83
Moreover, Professor Lemley asserted that “the balance of intellec-
tual property law is already tilted heavily in favor of the intellectual
property owner,” and that “[t]he only countervailing forces favoring
users are those rights specifically granted to users by federal law.”84  In
conclusion, he proposed an amendment to the U.C.C.’s Article 2B
77. Id. at 961–64.
78. Id. at 964.
79. See, e.g., Nimmer et al., supra note 1, at 52–53; Olson, supra note 1, at 102. R
80. See Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 1263 & nn.105–106 (discussing the R
approach used in drafting the U.C.C. regarding the preemption of shrinkwrap licenses).
81. Id. at 1263–64.
82. Id. at 1278.
83. Id. at 1286.
84. Id. at 1282.
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that would invalidate a license term if it “creates an obligation or im-
poses a limitation on the licensee that is inconsistent with federal in-
tellectual property law, or that deprives the licensee of a right or
privilege granted the licensee under federal intellectual property
law.”85
Others have advocated similar approaches under Article 2B of
the U.C.C., express preemption under Section 301, or implied pre-
emption under the Supremacy Clause.  For instance, David Nimmer,
author of the leading copyright treatise, has argued that Article 2B
“must proscribe contracting practices that seek to extend copyright
protection beyond its current scope.”86  Thus, he has argued that
ProCD was wrongly decided because it allowed a database owner to use
a shrinkwrap license to protect factual information that the Supreme
Court had held was uncopyrightable.87  Another commentator has ar-
gued that courts should apply implied constitutional preemption to
contract claims, because express preemption under Section 301 is
“necessarily limited” by the subject matter and equivalence require-
ments.88  Thus, the thrust of the scholarly criticism of ProCD has been
that contracts, especially form contracts such as shrinkwrap licenses,
alter the “delicate balance” of rights established by the Copyright Act,
and must therefore be preempted.
2. Evaluation of Categorical Approaches to Contract Preemption
Despite the seductive simplicity of Judge Easterbrook’s logic in
ProCD, it is impossible to conclude that contracts should not be pre-
empted based on the categorical notion that contracts affect only
their parties and therefore do not create exclusive rights.  This one-
size-fits-all approach to preemption is inconsistent with preemption
doctrine generally, as well as with preemption doctrine as it has been
applied to non-contract state law claims under the Copyright Act.
First, state law claims do not survive preemption under the Copy-
right Act simply because they have a somewhat different scope than
copyright infringement claims.  All state law claims affect only parties
who act in certain ways or who meet certain criteria.  As such, they
affect only a subset of those affected by the Copyright Act.  Neverthe-
85. Id. at 1292.
86. Nimmer et al., supra note 1, at 19. R
87. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 1.01[B][1][a][iii]; Nimmer et al., supra R
note 1, at 52–53 (expressing that ProCD “violated a core polic[y] of the Copyright Act by R
extending quasi-copyright protection to works that do not qualify as ‘original’”).
88. See Olson, supra note 1, at 130 (“Constitutional preemption . . . gives courts much R
broader power to strike down state claims or state laws that threaten the ‘precarious bal-
ance’ . . . struck by federal copyright law.”).
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less, courts preempt many of these state law claims.89  For instance, an
unfair competition claim requiring misappropriation for commercial
advantage applies only to those parties who compete with the plaintiff.
Because there is no such requirement in copyright, this state law claim
is not coextensive with a copyright infringement claim.  Indeed, it can
be said that this state law claim also does not create exclusive rights
that are equivalent to copyrights because it does not apply to everyone
but only to those who decide to compete with the plaintiff.  Yet, many
courts have held that this claim is equivalent to a copyright claim and
therefore preempted.90
Second, Judge Easterbrook’s argument that contracts should not
be preempted is at odds with his earlier work on economic interpreta-
tion of statutes.91  He has previously argued that special-interest stat-
utes are essentially “contracts” among special-interest groups who
lobby for legislation.  As such, he has said that they should be con-
strued narrowly against these groups just as ordinary contracts are
construed against the drafters.92  Because Congress’s purpose in pass-
ing this legislation is simply to enforce the legislative “deal” struck
among these groups, the narrow construction rule would effectuate
legislative intent by giving the parties only what the statute clearly pro-
vides.93  Thus, under his view, parties should not be allowed to circum-
vent the deal they agreed to before Congress by arguing for greater
rights in the courts.
Indeed, Judge Easterbrook has suggested that courts should pay
particular attention to special-interest influence in areas such as “anti-
trust, intellectual property, and securities regulation—the ‘traditional’
economic subjects.”94  Moreover, he has observed that special-interest
legislation typically confers concentrated benefits to some groups
while imposing diffuse costs to other groups, has a detailed structure
89. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text (discussing judicial application of the R
“extra-element” test for determining whether state law claims are equivalent to copyright
claims).
90. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. R
91. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15
(1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, The Court] (explaining that judges may alter “economic
relations on the basis of . . . statutes generally . . . designed to overcome ‘failures’ in mar-
kets” in certain situations); see also Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 567, 576–77 (2006) (discussing Judge Easterbrook’s economic approach
to statutory interpretation and arguing that this and other approaches to statutory inter-
pretation require construing the Copyright Act in favor of the public interest).
92. Easterbrook, The Court, supra note 91, at 15. R
93. See id. (“The maxim ‘Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed’ sums up this approach.”).
94. See id. at 18 (arguing that courts should not “limit the application” of economic
themes of interpretation to these “‘traditional’ economic subjects”).
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reflecting interest group compromise, and has a legislative history
documenting the influence of interest groups.95
As I have argued elsewhere, the Copyright Act bears all of Judge
Easterbrook’s indicia of special-interest legislation.96  The benefits of
copyright protection are concentrated in copyright owners, while the
costs of that protection are spread among all users of copyrighted
works, essentially the entire public.97  Thus, copyright owners have an
incentive to lobby for expansive protection, while individual users do
not, even where the aggregate costs to users are greater than the ag-
gregate benefits to the copyright owners.98  Moreover, the complex
and detailed structure of the Act, as well as its legislative history, “re-
veal[ ] that most of [its] statutory language was not drafted by mem-
bers of Congress or their staffs at all . . . [but instead] evolved through
a process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and other parties
with economic interests in the property rights the statute defines.”99
Under Judge Easterbrook’s approach to statutory interpretation,
special-interest statutes such as the Copyright Act should be treated
like contracts and construed narrowly against interest groups like
those representing copyright owners.100  This view seems to support
the pro-preemption view that because copyright law is already tilted in
favor of copyright owners, they should be held to the deal and should
not be able to enlarge their copyrights through other means.101  Thus,
it is unclear why Judge Easterbrook asserts in ProCD that copyright
owners should be able to enlarge their rights by contract as a matter
of course.102  More specifically, it is unclear why he interprets the Cop-
yright Act’s preemption clause in a way that virtually never preempts
copyright owners from enlarging the rights they bargained for before
Congress.
Third, the ProCD decision mischaracterizes Supreme Court prece-
dent on this issue. ProCD states the broad proposition that “courts
usually read preemption clauses to leave private contracts unaffected,”
citing the Supreme Court’s decision in American Airlines, Inc. v.
95. See id. at 16–18.
96. Bohannan, supra note 91, at 581–86. R
97. Id. at 582.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 584 (quoting Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative His-
tory, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860–61 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Easterbrook, The Court, supra note 91, at 15. R
101. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. R
102. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Wolens103 as an example.104  But Wolens cannot be read to support such
a sweeping proposition.
Wolens considered the scope of the preemption clause of the Air-
line Deregulation Act (ADA), which partially repealed the Federal Avi-
ation Act (FAA) of 1958.105  The ADA’s preemption clause provides,
in relevant part, that “[N]o State . . . shall enact or enforce any law,
rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and ef-
fect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air car-
rier . . . .”106  The Supreme Court acknowledged that the language of
the ADA’s preemption clause could easily be read to preempt all kinds
of state laws, including a state’s enforcement of contract law.107  The
Court held, however, that although the clause preempted a state law
claim for consumer fraud, it did not preempt a state law contract
claim.108
In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook suggests that the Supreme Court’s
disparate treatment of these two claims reflects a categorical distinc-
tion between a generally applicable state law and a private agreement
that is merely enforced by state contract law.109  Thus, he says, “The
Court allowed that it is possible to read the statute that broadly [to
preempt contract claims] but thought such an interpretation would
make little sense.  Terms and conditions offered by contract reflect
private ordering, essential to the efficient functioning of markets.”110
Contrary to Judge Easterbrook’s suggestion, however, the Wolens
Court’s decision that the ADA does not preempt private agreements
was not based on a simplistic distinction between private agreements
and general laws.  Rather, consistent with preemption doctrine gener-
ally, the Court reached this result only after conducting a painstaking
analysis of the ADA’s preemption clause in light of the particular pur-
pose of the statute.111  Because the purpose of the ADA is somewhat
unusual—unlike most other statutes, it seeks to deregulate an industry
103. 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
104. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.
105. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222.
106. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
107. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 n.5.
108. See id. at 228 (“We do not read the ADA’s preemption clause . . . to shelter airlines
from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for
the airline’s alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings.”).
109. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454–55.
110. Id.
111. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 221–28.
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rather than regulate it112—the Court placed particular emphasis on
that purpose in its analysis.
The Wolens Court acknowledged that because the ADA’s preemp-
tion clause bans a state from “‘enforc[ing]’ as well as ‘enact[ing]’”
certain laws, it “could perhaps be read to preempt even state-court
enforcement of private contracts.”113  It concluded, however, that
the ban on enacting or enforcing any law “relating to rates,
routes, or services” is most sensibly read, in light of the
ADA’s overarching deregulatory purpose, to mean “States
may not seek to impose their own public policies or theories
of competition or regulation on the operations of an air
carrier.”114
Thus, the Court explained that private contracts are not preempted
under the ADA because they do not conflict with the ADA’s deregu-
latory purpose: “The ADA . . . was designed to promote ‘maximum
reliance on competitive market forces,’” and that “[m]arket efficiency
requires effective means to enforce private agreements.”115
Clearly, Wolens does not reflect a categorical rule that federal stat-
utes ordinarily do not preempt private contracts.  Rather, it reflects a
detailed analysis of the language and purpose of a statute’s particular
express preemption clause.  Because the ADA was enacted to deregu-
late the industry, the court concluded that preemption of private con-
tracts under the statute would be antithetical to its purpose.
But this reasoning does not apply to regulatory statutes like the
Copyright Act.  The Copyright Act strikes a balance among numerous
parties with interests in copyrights, including authors, publishers, li-
braries, educational institutions, and others.116  There is no reason
that a comprehensive statute that finely tunes the rights and liabilities
of many affected groups should have as little preemptive effect as one
that encourages industry players to do as they please.
There are also important textual differences between the ADA
and Copyright Act preemption clauses that suggest courts should take
a different approach to preemption under the two statutes.  The ADA
preemption clause says that “[N]o State . . . shall enact or enforce any
112. Thus, the Court reiterated numerous times “the ADA’s purpose to leave largely to
the airlines themselves, and not at all to States, the selection and design of marketing
mechanisms appropriate to the furnishing of air transportation services.” Id. at 228.
113. Id. at 229 n.5 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae In Support of
Reversal at 17, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (No. 93-1286)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. (quoting Brief for United States, supra note 113, at 16). R
115. Id. at 230.
116. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 99, at 869. R
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law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force
and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air car-
rier . . . .”117  Significantly, this language operates against the states
and is an express prohibition on state action.  As such, it lends credi-
bility to the Wolens Court’s conclusion that “the word series ‘law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision . . . connotes official, govern-
ment-imposed policies, not the terms of a private contract.’”118
By contrast, Section 301 of the Copyright Act actually preempts
individual ownership of certain rights.  It states that “no person is enti-
tled to any such right or equivalent right,” except as provided by the
Act.119  This language undermines Judge Easterbrook’s assertion that
the Copyright Act’s preemption clause, like the ADA’s preemption
clause, does not affect contract rights because its purpose is only to
“prevent[ ] states from substituting their own regulatory systems for
those of the national government.”120
Finally, and most important, Judge Easterbrook is simply wrong
that contracts affect only their parties and are therefore ordinarily im-
mune to copyright preemption.121  Judge Easterbrook’s approach as-
sumes that the entire Copyright Act merely sets default rules that
parties may contract around.  He believes that the Copyright Act sim-
ply fills in for the market where transactions costs are too high.  In his
view, as technology reduces transactions costs, it facilitates contracts
that supersede the statutory regime.  Thus, he argues:
It is ironic that just as a global network and automation are
reducing the costs of contracting, some scholars promote
contract-defeating schemes.  One is tempted to think that
they are concerned not about market failures but about mar-
ket successes—about the prospect that the sort of world peo-
ple prefer when they vote with their own pocketbooks will
117. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
118. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 n.5 (quoting Brief for United States, supra note 113, at 16). R
119. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
120. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).  Moreover, as the
Wolens Court noted, the ADA left intact a savings clause from the FAA, which provided that
“‘[n]othing . . . in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing
at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies.’” Wolens, 513 U.S. at 222 (quoting Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1506 (1988)).  Thus, the Court thought that its holding was necessary to “make[ ] sense
of” Congress’s decision to retain that clause. Id. at 232.  The Copyright Act contains no
such savings clause.
121. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454–55.
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depart from the proposers’ ideas of what people ought to
prefer.122
It is clear, however, that copyright law strikes a delicate balance
among many different parties with varying interests, many of whom
are not parties to these license agreements.  Unfortunately, some cop-
yright scholars have used this argument to support an approach to
contract preemption that is nearly as categorical as Judge Easter-
brook’s approach.  The “delicate balance” approach suggests that con-
tracts should be invalidated any time they provide for a different
allocation of rights than the Copyright Act provides, particularly when
the contract is a form contract or shrinkwrap license.123
The “delicate balance” approach would not force courts to con-
sider each contract claim’s effect on copyright policy any more than
the “contracts are different” approach does.  Rather, the “delicate bal-
ance” approach seems to weigh arguments in favor of contract against
arguments in favor of copyright policy at the wholesale level, conclud-
ing that the cumulative interests in effectuating copyright policy are
too important to permit enforcement of any of these contracts.  Such
a draconian approach to contract preemption is reminiscent of field
preemption, which is clearly inapplicable to a statute like the Copy-
right Act that depends on contracts to achieve its objectives.124  It is no
wonder, then, that Professor Lemley has argued that other doctrinal
tools such as misuse should be used to police license agreements, be-
cause “[u]sing preemption doctrine against contracts is something
like swinging a sledgehammer at a gnat.”125
122. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, supra note 1, at 967.  This point is merely a R
more technical version of Easterbrook’s holding in ProCD that contracts should not be
preempted because they affect only those in privity.  If the only purpose of a statutory
provision is to provide a default rule when transactions costs are too high for individual
parties to contract, and technology solves the transactions costs problem, then the result-
ing contract must affect only those who are parties to the contract.
123. See, e.g., Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 12.  In fairness to Professor Lemley, R
he recognizes that some of the Copyright Act’s provisions might set default rules, but he
says that does not justify treating all the provisions as default rules.  His proposal, however,
was that all shrinkwrap licenses contradicting federal copyright law should be invalidated.
Although his proposal was intended to amend the draft U.C.C., which had made shrink-
wrap licenses presumptively enforceable as a matter of contract law, he made it clear that
his approach was based in large part on preemption principles.  To that extent, his ap-
proach is too categorical because it does not allow or require courts to assess whether a
particular contract interferes with the purpose of federal copyright law.
124. See generally Wolfson, supra note 1, at 84–93 (explaining that information industries R
rely on contracts to protect certain types of content from unrestricted use and to increase
access to information).
125. Lemley, Beyond Preemption, supra note 12, at 145.  This is a true statement given the R
categorical way in which preemption law has been applied to contract claims.  This Article
provides a more nuanced approach.
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Thus, one side of the debate assumes that contracts modifying
statutory copyrights always affect others and therefore always should
be preempted.  The other side of the debate assumes that such con-
tracts never affect others and therefore never should be preempted.
Neither side requires courts to consider which contracts interfere with
copyright policy and which ones do not.
3. The Extra-Element Approach
Other courts purport to take a more nuanced approach to con-
tract preemption, holding that not “all state law contract claims sur-
vive preemption simply because they involve the additional element of
promise.”126  Rather, they decide whether a contract claim should be
preempted by applying the extra-element test applicable to non-con-
tract state law claims.127  Under the extra-element test, courts consider
whether the state law right would “be abridged by an act which, in and
of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights [granted by the
Copyright Act].”128  Thus, in contract preemption, courts have held
that “[i]f the promise amounts only to a promise to refrain from re-
producing, performing, distributing or displaying the work, then the
contract claim is preempted.”129
The leading copyright treatise, Nimmer on Copyright, supports this
approach to express preemption in most cases:
[a] Breach of Contract.  Adverting first to contract rights . . .
pre-emption should be found absent to the extent that a
breach of contract cause of action alleges more than simply
reproduction (or adaptation, distribution, etc.) of a copy-
righted work.  For example, although an author’s right to
royalties under a publication contract . . . may be condi-
tioned on the publisher’s acts of reproduction and distribu-
tion of copies of the work, there is another crucial act that
stands as a condition to the publisher’s liability: the pub-
lisher’s promise to pay the stated royalty.130
The extra-element approach to preemption seems less categori-
cal than Judge Easterbrook’s “contracts are different” approach, be-
126. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 458.
128. Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d
on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
129. Wrench, 256 F.3d at 457; see also Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F.
Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that a state contract claim is preempted if the
claim is premised solely on allegations that a defendant made unauthorized use of material
in violation of copyright law).
130. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, § 1.01[B][1][a][i]. R
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cause it purports to examine the content of contractual promises.  In
practice, however, the two approaches virtually always yield the same
result: the contract is not preempted.  The reason for this conver-
gence is that contracts controlling the use of a work of authorship
usually contain some additional promise that is at least nominally dif-
ferent from the promise to refrain from infringing an exclusive right.
Contracts are probably unnecessary if breach of the contract occurs
simultaneously with copyright infringement.  Thus, contracts are
likely to include not merely promises to refrain from violating copy-
rights, but rather promises to pay some amount for the use of a work
or to refrain from using the work in a way the Copyright Act otherwise
would allow.  Because the extra-element test focuses on whether the
elements of the contract claim are the same as the elements of a copy-
right claim, courts generally find that such an additional promise
defeats express preemption.  Thus, the Nimmer treatise concludes
that “contract-based rights . . . are typically not subject to pre-
emption.”131
Moreover, as we have seen in preemption of non-contract state
law claims, the extra-element test is too malleable to be coherent and
provides little real guidance to courts in deciding whether the claims
should be preempted.  Most state law claims (such as unfair competi-
tion or misappropriation) also contain some kind of additional ele-
ment.  In those cases, courts have begun to look more closely at such
elements in order to determine whether the state law claim interferes
with the purpose of a federal statutory provision.
Similarly, courts addressing contract preemption should decide
cases based on whether the contract claim interferes with federal cop-
yright policy.  The extra-element test is not an accurate diagnostic tool
for making this determination.  In practice, the extra-element test usu-
ally preempts to the same extent as the “contracts are different” ap-
proach.  It is capable, however, of both over- and under-preempting.
That is, contract claims that do not contain an additional promise are
always preempted even though they sometimes do not interfere with
copyright policy, and contract claims containing an additional prom-
ise are never preempted even though they do sometimes interfere
with copyright policy.
131. Id. § 1.01[B][1][a][i].  He notes only a few “untypical” situations in which they
would be preempted.  For instance, under conflict preemption, a contract would not be
enforceable under state law if it was not made in accordance with the Copyright Act’s
express requirements for that type of contract.  Thus, for example, because the Act re-
quires copyright assignments to be in writing, it would preempt a state’s attempt to make
an oral assignment enforceable.  Id. § 1.01[B][3][a].
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For instance, in Wolff v. Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers,
Inc., a district court held that the Copyright Act preempted a contract
claim because it lacked an extra element, even though the claim did
not interfere with copyright policy.132  The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had infringed his copyright and breached their contract by
republishing a photograph that the plaintiff had licensed to the de-
fendant for a single publication.133  The court held that the Copyright
Act preempted the breach of contract claim because the contract
merely promised not to reproduce the photograph, which it con-
cluded was equivalent to a promise to refrain from committing copy-
right infringement.134
It is clear, however, that the contract claim did not interfere with
copyright policy, and therefore should not have been preempted.  In-
deed, it is likely that the contract furthered copyright policy. Under
the Copyright Act, the plaintiff owned the exclusive right to
reproduce his photograph.  The purpose of granting authors the ex-
clusive right to reproduce their works is so that they may obtain com-
pensation from others for the right to reproduce those works.  The
contract merely defined the extent of the rights the plaintiff agreed to
license to the defendant.  Thus, the contract was simply the means by
which the copyright owner exchanged certain of her exclusive rights
for payment.  Because the photograph was copyrightable and its re-
production did not constitute fair use, the agreement complemented
copyright law and should not have been preempted.
On the other hand, in Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., the Sixth
Circuit held that because a contract contained an additional prom-
ise—a promise to pay for use of a work—the contract claim was not
preempted.135  Applying the extra-element test, the court explained
that “[i]t is not the use of the work alone but the failure to pay for it
that violates the contract and gives rise to the right to recover dam-
ages.”136  By concluding that the mere existence of this element de-
feated preemption, the court failed to consider the ways in which the
contract might have impaired copyright policy.
132. 768 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
133. Id. at 67.
134. Id. at 69.  The Wolff court relied in part on the legislative history of Section
301(b)(3), concluding that Congress’s deletion of contract actions as a category of non-
preempted claims meant that Congress did not intend generally to exempt these actions
from preemption. Id.; see also supra note 61. R
135. 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001).
136. Id. at 456.
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In Wrench, plaintiff Wrench was a company that produced, mar-
keted, and licensed the “Psycho Chihuahua” cartoon character.137
The character was described as “a clever, feisty dog with an attitude; a
self-confident, edgy, cool dog who knows what he wants and will not
back down.”138  Taco Bell employees saw the character at a trade
show.139  After consulting with Wrench employees, they began pro-
moting Psycho Chihuahua within Taco Bell as an idea for an advertis-
ing campaign.140  The Taco Bell employees worked with Wrench’s
licensing agents for many months to develop marketing ideas for Taco
Bell using the Psycho Chihuahua.141  In the end, however, Taco Bell
decided not to use Psycho Chihuahua.142
In the meantime, Taco Bell had hired a new advertising
agency.143  Within a couple of months, the agency proposed a com-
mercial to Taco Bell in which a real (non-cartoon) “male Chihuahua
would pass up a female Chihuahua to get to . . . Taco Bell food.”144
The agency claimed that two of its employees conceived of the idea
independently.145  After consumers reacted positively to the commer-
cial, Taco Bell made the Chihuahua the focus of a national advertising
campaign.146
Wrench brought suit against Taco Bell for breach of an implied-
in-fact contract as well as for several tort and statutory claims under
state law.147  The district court found that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support an implied-in-fact contract, but held that the Copy-
right Act preempted the contract claim because Wrench’s “right to be
paid under the contract was equivalent to the exclusive rights that the
Copyright Act grants to authors.”148
The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the prom-
ise to pay in the implied-in-fact contract constituted an extra element
that allowed the contract claim to survive preemption.149  The court
137. Id. at 449.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 449–50.
140. Id. at 450.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 451.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 452 (citing Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848–58 (W.D.
Mich. 1999)).
149. Id. at 457.
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treated the Wrench case as a straightforward application of the extra-
element test and Nimmer’s publication contract example:
[A]s in the example given in Nimmer on Copyright, there is
another crucial act that stands as a condition to the appel-
lee’s liability, to wit: its promise to pay for the use of the
work.  Thus, this is a case in which the breach of contract
cause of action alleges more than reproduction, adaptation,
etc., simpliciter.150
The Wrench court’s application of the extra-element test is far too
simplistic.  The Copyright Act encourages innovation by giving au-
thors exclusive rights in their works of authorship.  The exclusive
rights do not guarantee that an author’s work will be commercially
viable, but they do generally require payment for use of the work if it
does become commercially viable.  Thus, the right to payment for a
work is, in some sense, equivalent to an exclusive right in the work.
Accordingly, the court was wrong to conclude that a promise to pay
for use of a work is, categorically, an extra element that defeats pre-
emption.  Other courts have made the same mistake.151
Instead, courts must consider the nature of the contract claim
and the facts of the case to determine whether a promise to pay inter-
feres with copyright policy.  In some cases, a contractual promise to
pay for use of a work actually serves copyright policy.  Where the con-
tract requires the licensee to pay to use a work in a way that otherwise
would clearly constitute copyright infringement, the contract is consis-
tent with copyright policy.  Nimmer’s example of a publication con-
tract,152 cited by the court in Wrench,153 falls into this category.  With a
publication contract, it is usually clear that the author owns the copy-
right in the work that the publisher wishes to reproduce and dis-
tribute.  Thus, the publication contract, like the contract at issue in
Wolff,154 is simply the means by which the author exchanges certain of
her exclusive rights for payment.  As such, the agreement furthers the
purpose of the Copyright Act and should not be preempted.
Contractual promises to pay would also be permissible where they
are made in exchange for something other than a simple license to
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923, 926 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
no preemption for a breach of contract claim when the contract involved a separate prom-
ise to pay for use of copyrighted work); Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F.
Supp. 1201, 1205–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
152. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. R
153. 256 F.3d at 457.
154. Wolff v. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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use the work.  For instance, there is often uncertainty as to whether
the use of the work would constitute copyright infringement.  In such
cases, the user often promises to pay the copyright owner to resolve
the ambiguity and avoid future litigation or settle pending litigation.
Likewise, users also sometimes promise to pay the copyright owner for
consulting services or for pre-publication access to the work.  In these
situations, the promises to pay should be enforceable.
In other cases, however, the contractual promise to pay should
not be enforceable.  Where the contract promises to pay either to use
a work that clearly is not copyrightable or to use a work in a way that
clearly constitutes fair use, the contract presents an apparent conflict
with copyright policy. Wrench is arguably such a case.  Taco Bell ar-
gued that its advertising agency independently developed the Chihua-
hua advertising campaign.155  Moreover, even if Taco Bell got the
Chihuahua concept from Wrench, issues would remain regarding
whether Taco Bell appropriated copyrightable expression or merely
an uncopyrightable idea.  If Taco Bell either independently devel-
oped the concept or used only an uncopyrightable idea, it is pretty
clear that it did not violate Wrench’s copyright and would not have to
pay for use of the concept under the Copyright Act.  In either event,
the contractual promise runs contrary to copyright policy because it
requires payment for a use of material that the Copyright Act says
should be free.
This conflict presents a substantial preemption issue.  Indeed, the
reason that courts have held that the preemption clause applies to
both copyrightable and uncopyrightable subject matter is to ensure
that works of authorship will not be protected where the Copyright
Act would leave them in the public domain.156
The point here is not that promises to pay to use a work are al-
ways preempted where the use would not constitute infringement.
Rather, the point is that courts need to dispense with the simplistic
rule that a promise to pay is per se an extra element that defeats pre-
emption.  Courts must consider the particular contract as well as the
facts of the case to determine whether the contract claim interferes
with copyright policy.  Where the contract contains a promise to pay
for something other than a simple license to use the work, or to pay
for a license to use the work in a way that clearly would constitute
copyright infringement, the contract claim should not be preempted.
On the other hand, where the contracting party promises to pay to
155. Wrench, 256 F.3d at 451.
156. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. R
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use the work in a way that clearly would not require compensation
under the Copyright Act, the question is more complicated.  In that
case, courts should treat the promise to pay the same as a promise to
refrain from violating an exclusive right and then determine whether
the contract claim ought to be preempted under the proposed
approach.
B. A Proposed Approach to Contract Preemption: Insights From
Contractual Waiver of Statutory Rights
As the foregoing sections show, the fact that contracts are not
state-created obligations and depend on state law only for their en-
forcement makes it easy for courts to decide that contract claims are
different from other state law claims preempted by the Copyright Act.
Judge Easterbrook admits that federal copyright law preempts many
state law claims, but he believes that contracts are not similarly pre-
empted.  He says that individual contractual promises do not affect
copyright policy because they apply only to the individuals who made
them, and individuals can decide better than Congress how to deal
with copyrights.157  Similarly, although the Taco Bell court undoubt-
edly would have preempted a state law requiring payment to copy an
uncopyrightable work, the court viewed an individual party’s promise
to pay differently and did not preempt the contract claim.158
Copyright scholars, on the other hand, have argued almost uni-
formly that federal copyright policy should preempt contracts whose
terms differ from those of the Copyright Act.  Yet, copyright must al-
low some room for freedom to contract, and intuitively it does seem
that contract claims are different from copyright infringement claims
in ways that matter in preemption analysis.
Thus, copyright law lacks a coherent rule for contract preemp-
tion that harmonizes the individual interest in freedom of contract
and the societal interest in federal copyright policy.  As a result, pre-
emption doctrine is incapable of providing an effective remedy for
contractual overreaching.
In developing a rule for copyright preemption of contracts, it is
useful to consider why this issue has proved so difficult.  At least a
partial explanation is that preemption analysis is not well-suited to
contract claims.  Technically, this is a preemption issue because pri-
vate contracts depend on state law for enforcement.  But unlike in
most preemption cases, the issue in contract preemption cases is not
157. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, supra note 1. R
158. Wrench, 256 F.3d at 457.
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whether a state regulatory scheme is likely to supplant a federal
scheme.  Rather, the issue is whether individuals should be able to
contract away rights granted by the federal Copyright Act.
Accordingly, although courts should continue to treat this as a
preemption issue, their preemption analysis should draw more from
the law related to contractual waiver of statutory rights.  This body of
law governs the extent to which individual waivers of statutory rights
are enforceable and has been applied to a variety of state and federal
statutes.159
The law governing contractual waivers of statutory rights is readily
applicable to cases involving copyright preemption of contracts.  In
these cases, the challenged contracts typically involve a promise by a
licensee (user) not to use a work of authorship in a way that would be
permitted or privileged by the Copyright Act.  For example, licensees
might promise not to copy uncopyrightable ideas from a work, al-
though the Act would leave these ideas in the public domain for all to
use freely.  Or licensees might promise not to copy any part of a copy-
rightable work, although the Act would privilege some of this copying
under the fair use doctrine.  In these cases, the contractual promise
constitutes a contractual waiver of a statutory right.160  Thus, courts
considering whether the Copyright Act should preempt such con-
tracts can gain valuable insights by looking at the law governing con-
tractual waivers of statutory rights.
In general, the law governing contractual waivers of statutory
rights has established two requirements for enforceability of such
waivers.  A waiver is enforceable only if (1) it is “clear and unmistaka-
159. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that an
individual’s contractual waiver of the right to sue under state and federal antitrust laws was
invalid where the contractual prohibition on arbitration award of treble damages and at-
torney fees violated state and federal antitrust policy); Olympic Pipe Line Co. v. City of
Seattle, 437 F.3d 872, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an individual may not waive the
right to assert that federal law preempts state law); EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,
177 F.3d 448, 468 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that an individual waiver of the right to sue
under Title VII does not waive the EEOC’s right to sue the same defendant for public
enforcement of Title VII violations); In re Tulsa Energy, Inc., 111 F.3d 88, 90 (10th Cir.
1997) (applying waiver doctrine under Oklahoma law); Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Mass. 1990) (applying waiver doctrine under Massachu-
setts law).
160. I use the term “right” here broadly to include all privileges granted to users by the
Copyright Act.  This usage is consistent with the terminology of “user rights” in the litera-
ture on copyright license agreements and does not attempt to resolve or finesse the deeper
issue regarding the general distinction between rights and privileges.
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ble,”161 and (2) it waives a statutory right designed to protect the inter-
ests of individual parties rather than the public.162
Both of these requirements help to balance freedom of contract
with federal copyright policy.  The requirement that the waiver must
be clear and unmistakable helps to ensure that, in an age when statu-
tory rights are waived by opening a package or clicking a button, the
user will at least understand clearly that she is waiving her rights.
Thus, it protects federal copyright policy by keeping the federal statu-
tory provision in place until it is clearly waived.  Moreover, because the
law will not imply a waiver of statutory rights from ambiguous contrac-
tual language, the drafter has an incentive to make the contract ex-
plicit.  As a result, the requirement should facilitate informed
contracting.  Where the waiver is clear and unmistakable, it will be
enforced unless it fails the second requirement.
The second requirement, that waivers are enforceable where they
protect individual rather than public interests, strikes the correct bal-
ance between freedom of contract and federal copyright policy by
showing courts how to conduct an appropriate preemption analysis in
contract cases.  Statutory purpose is the touchstone of preemption
analysis, and courts typically consider whether a state law claim inter-
feres with that purpose by considering the factual and legal details of
each claim.  Nevertheless, courts overwhelmingly have held that indi-
vidual contractual promises regarding uses of works of authorship are
not preempted on the theory that those promises are not equivalent
to copyrights and therefore do not interfere with copyright policy.  By
contrast, copyright scholars have argued that all contractual promises
to waive copyright’s statutory protections should be preempted be-
cause they violate copyright policy by upsetting copyright’s “delicate
balance” of rights.
It is clear, however, that some contracts interfere with the pur-
pose of copyright law while others do not.  The second waiver require-
ment shows that whether a contractual promise to waive rights
conferred by a statutory provision ought to be preempted depends
upon whose interests the statutory provision protects.  Some statutory
provisions merely set a default rule to define the rights of parties
where those particular parties might be unable to reach an agree-
ment, presumably due to transaction costs.  For instance, the copying
of very small amounts of material is permitted under both the fair use
161. E.g., Uforma/Shelby Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1284, 1289 (6th Cir.
1997).
162. E.g., In re Tulsa, 111 F.3d at 90; Canal Elec., 548 N.E.2d at 187.
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and de minimis doctrines.  In some cases, these doctrines protect such
copying on the ground that transactions costs are greater than the
amount that would be paid for the minimal copying.163  Today, com-
puter software and other technology have begun to facilitate the con-
venient payment of small amounts for small uses.  As this technology
becomes widespread, it could overcome the transactions costs prob-
lem, allowing contracts to be formed regarding the small uses of copy-
righted material.  While the “delicate balance” approach suggests that
any contract limiting statutory fair use rights should be preempted,
these contracts should not be preempted because the purpose of the
statutory provision has been served by the formation of a contract.
On the other hand, the fact that two parties have entered into a
contract to modify a statutory provision does not always indicate that
the market failure giving rise to the statutory provision has been over-
come.  Some statutory provisions seek to establish the proper alloca-
tion of rights in light of the interests of many affected parties.  If a
couple of those parties agree between themselves that the rule should
be different, they affect not only themselves but also many others.  A
notable example of this occurs in bankruptcy law.  A debtor’s contrac-
tual promise to a creditor to forgo the right to file for bankruptcy
could affect the amount other creditors could receive.  As a result,
such contracts are unenforceable under the federal Bankruptcy
Act.164
Likewise, in copyright, a journalist’s promise to forgo making fair
use of copyrighted material could prevent the dissemination of news
to the public.  This is an example of the fair use doctrine’s protection
of transformative uses.  Transformative uses of copyrighted material
include scholarship, criticism, comment, news reporting, research, ed-
ucation, and other uses that add “new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage” to the copyrighted material.165  The statutory protection of
transformative uses is typically justified on the ground that these uses
benefit other people—often large segments of society—beyond just
the individual user.  For example, Justice Blackmun explained this
view in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.:
163. E.g., Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9 (1985),
rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
164. See, e.g., In re Cole, 226 B.R. 647, 651–54 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (upholding a lower
court decision invalidating a waiver of right to file bankruptcy); In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431,
433–34 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code extinguishes individuals’
rights to contract around its essential provisions because of the potential detriment to
other creditors).
165. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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The scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to
bargain with each copyright owner for permission to quote
from or refer to prior works.  But there is a crucial difference
between the scholar and the ordinary user.  When the ordi-
nary user decides that the owner’s price is too high, and
forgoes use of the work, only the individual is the loser.
When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior work, not only
does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived of his
contribution to knowledge. The scholar’s work, in other words,
produces external benefits from which everyone profits.  In such a
case, the fair use doctrine acts as a form of subsidy—albeit at
the first author’s expense—to permit the second author to
make limited use of the first author’s work for the public
good.166
Theoretically, all of the people who benefit from the scholar’s use
of a work could be identified and invited to participate in a collective
bargaining process.  Practically speaking, however, this will never hap-
pen because the transactions costs would be too great.
As a result, even where some of the parties can reach an agree-
ment regarding permission to make a transformative use, it is highly
unlikely that the agreement will represent the interests of all of the
parties affected by the agreement.  Accordingly, such a contract ordi-
narily should be preempted.  Although Judge Easterbrook is right that
we should “endow authors with a set of property rights—and let peo-
ple work out the details for themselves,”167 we should not let them
work out the details for other people who cannot be brought to the bar-
gaining table.
In sum, preemption doctrine requires courts to assess each con-
tract preemption case to determine whether the challenged contract
interferes with the purpose of copyright law.  The waiver approach
helps courts to make this determination by directing them to con-
sider, on a case-by-case basis, whether the copyright licensee is waiving
rights granted for her benefit or rights granted for the benefit of
others.  Where the statutory provision grants a right for the protection
of individuals, courts may ordinarily treat it as a default provision that
individuals may contract around.  On the other hand, where the pro-
vision creates a right for the protection of the public, individuals ordi-
narily should not be able to waive it.  The right is not theirs to give
away, and, if enforced, the waiver could affect the public in a way that
166. 464 U.S. 417, 477–78 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
167. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, supra note 1, at 961. R
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the Act sought to avoid.  In that case, there is at least an ostensible
conflict between the contract and the Copyright Act.
The proposed waiver approach to preemption helps reconcile
the interests in freedom of contract with the interests in enforcing
federal copyright policy by directing courts to determine when a con-
tract provision is truly an obstacle to the purpose of a provision of the
Act.  Where the contract modifies a statutory right that sets a default
rule, the contract probably does not interfere with the purposes of
federal copyright law.  Where the contract modifies a statutory right
intended to benefit numerous parties, the contract presents a poten-
tial obstacle to the objectives of copyright law.  Even here, however, it
will sometimes be possible that enforcing such individual waivers will
somehow effectuate statutory purpose in the aggregate.  Thus, waiver
analysis indicates where there is prima facie a conflict between enforce-
ment of a contract and federal copyright law, but the ultimate touch-
stone for preemption is still whether the contract interferes with the
purpose of federal copyright law.  The next section will illustrate the
proposed approach further by demonstrating how these requirements
would have resolved some controversial contract preemption cases.
1. Case Studies: ProCD Reconstructed and Bowers v. Baystate
Reconsidered
As previously discussed, ProCD is wrong in its categorical state-
ment that the Copyright Act does not preempt the enforcement of
contracts because contracts are simply not equivalent to copyrights.168
Contrary to widespread criticism, however, the case was correctly de-
cided on its facts, and there is much in the opinion that is praisewor-
thy.  Indeed, much of Judge Easterbrook’s analysis provides excellent
guidance to courts on how they should analyze the particular facts and
claims of each contract preemption case to determine whether the
contract subverts copyright policy.
To restate briefly the facts in ProCD, the plaintiff had created an
uncopyrightable database of information including telephone num-
bers and zip codes.  He distributed the same database with at least two
different contracts.  Under one contract, the price was lower but the
use was restricted to personal use, while under the other contract, the
price was higher but commercial use was permitted.  The defendant
bought the version limited to personal use, then used it for commer-
cial purposes.  The plaintiff sued for breach of contract.  The defen-
dant argued that the Copyright Act preempted enforcement of the
168. See supra Part III.A.2.
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contract because the contract restricted his use of information that
the Act says should be in the public domain.169
Under the proposed waiver approach to contract preemption, it
is first important to note that the contract clearly stated the defendant
could not use the database for commercial purposes.  Thus, it unam-
biguously required the defendant to waive his right to copy the un-
copyrightable data.  Second, the contract fettered the defendant’s
statutory right to copy uncopyrightable facts.  The reason the Copy-
right Act provides that facts are uncopyrightable is to preserve public
access to such facts.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Feist,
“[t]hroughout history, copyright law has ‘recognize[d] a greater need
to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.’”170
Thus, it is clear that the contract presented at least an ostensible con-
flict with a statutory rule intended to protect the public.
Based on this apparent conflict, many have argued that ProCD was
wrongly decided because it upsets the “delicate balance” that the Cop-
yright Act establishes.  As was previously argued, however, this categor-
ical approach does not allow courts to consider whether a particular
contract is truly an obstacle to statutory objectives.  Because interfer-
ence with statutory purpose is the touchstone of preemption, it is not
enough for preemption that the contract presents an apparent con-
flict with the Copyright Act.
Although Judge Easterbrook’s decision rests ostensibly on the ar-
gument that contracts should not be preempted because they do not
create exclusive rights, it is clear that he considered whether the par-
ticular claim, or the factual circumstances giving rise to the claim,
threatened copyright law.171  He reached two important conclusions
that demonstrate the contract claim did not interfere with the Copy-
right Act’s purpose of making facts available to the public.
First, he found that the plaintiff’s particular contract claim was an
attempt to enforce a price discrimination strategy, which he said ordi-
narily allows greater access to a product than if such a contractual
strategy were preempted: “If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and
make a profit by charging a single price—that is, if it could not charge
more to commercial users than to the general public—it would have
169. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449–55 (7th Cir. 1996).
170. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1985) (quoting Harper
& Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 471
U.S. 539 (1985)) (rejecting the “sweat of the brow” doctrine which had extended copyright
protection to allow copyrighting of collections of facts to reward industrious collection).
171. See infra notes 172–175 and accompanying text. R
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to raise the price substantially . . . .”172  Thus, “[e]nforcement of the
shrinkwrap license may even make information more readily available,
by reducing the price ProCD charges to consumer buyers.”173
Second, he considered the particular factual circumstances of the
claim and found no real threat to copyright policy.  He explained that
the product was merely a database of basic telephone book informa-
tion that “[e]veryone remains free to copy and disseminate . . . .”174
Thus, he emphasized that enforcement of the contract limiting use of
this product “would not withdraw any information from the public
domain.”175
Unfortunately, too many other courts fail to follow the analytical
approach set forth in the ProCD decision and instead seem to rely ex-
clusively on its “contracts are different” rationale.  Indeed, even where
parties have argued that waiver law and statutory purpose should in-
form the court’s analysis, courts have failed to see the significance of
this approach.  The best (or worst) example of this is the Federal Cir-
cuit case of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.176
In Bowers, the Federal Circuit held that under applicable First Cir-
cuit precedent, the Copyright Act did not preempt a contract prohib-
iting reverse engineering of computer software.177  The Bowers court
acknowledged Federal Circuit precedent holding that reverse engi-
neering is protected as a fair use exception to copyright infringe-
ment.178  Nevertheless, it found that state law precedent allowed
contractual waivers of statutory rights in some circumstances.179  The
court did not, however, look at that precedent to determine under
what circumstances waivers should be enforced.  Instead, it simply said
that because waivers are allowed in some circumstances, it could apply
the First Circuit’s extra-element test for copyright preemption.180
Applying a categorical version of the extra-element test and citing
ProCD, the Bowers court found that “the mutual assent and considera-
tion required by a contract claim” constitute extra elements that
“render that claim qualitatively different from copyright infringe-
172. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
173. Id. at 1455.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
177. Id. at 1325.
178. Id.
179. See id. (citing courts that found contractual waivers of statutory rights permissible).
180. Id.; see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164–65
(1st Cir. 1994) (adopting the extra-element test for copyright preemption and finding a
state trade secret claim not preempted).
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ment.”181  Thus, the court concluded that “the First Circuit would find
that private parties are free to contractually forego [sic] the limited
ability to reverse engineer a software product under the exemptions
of the Copyright Act.”182
By relying on the simplistic “contracts are different” rationale,
Bowers failed to consider whether the contractual waiver at issue was,
in fact, a threat to copyright policy.  Indeed, the court failed in two
lines of inquiry, either one of which might have led it to a different
conclusion.  First, although the court cited ProCD, it failed to conduct
the kind of preemption analysis that Judge Easterbrook undertook.183
That preemption analysis would have required the court to consider
whether enforcing this particular contractual claim (a prohibition on
reverse engineering) on the particular facts (such as plaintiff’s power
to exclude rivals from the market, if that were the case) would have
threatened copyright policy.184
Second, the Bowers court failed to consider whether the defen-
dant’s contractual waiver of its statutory right to reverse engineer was
enforceable under applicable First Circuit and state law precedent.185
It treated the cases only superficially, citing them for the vague pro-
position that “in some circumstances contractual waiver of statutory
rights is permissible.”186  But those cases actually require a court to
examine the purpose of the particular statutory right that has been
waived.187  Specifically, they state that “a contractual waiver of statu-
tory rights is permissible when the statute’s purpose is the ‘protection
of the property rights of individual parties . . . rather than . . . the
protection of the general public.’”188
Clearly, both preemption and waiver analysis required the Bowers
court to examine the threat to copyright’s statutory purpose.  Specifi-
cally, the court should have considered the purpose of the fair use
exception for reverse engineering and whether the contract at issue
threatened that purpose.
181. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
182. Id. at 1325–26.
183. Id. at 1325.
184. See supra notes 172–175 and accompanying text. R
185. See Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325–26 (discussing First Circuit cases on enforceability of
contractual waivers of statutory rights).
186. Id. at 1325 (quoting Tompkins v. United Healthcare of New England, Inc., 203
F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. See Continental Corp. v. Gowdy, 186 N.E. 244, 249 (Mass. 1933) (“[W]hether the
effect of any specific statute can be avoided by contract depends upon the purpose for
which the statute was enacted.”).
188. Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Mass. 1990)
(quoting Continental Corp., 186 N.E. at 250).
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Bowers acknowledged that under Federal Circuit precedent, “re-
verse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a
computer program is a fair use.”189 Bowers explained that the court
recognized the exception because “[a] prohibition on all copying
whatsoever would stifle the free flow of ideas without serving any legit-
imate interest of the copyright holder.”190  Nevertheless, under the
“contracts are different” rationale, the Bowers court held that the Cop-
yright Act does not preempt contractual agreements to forgo the
right.191  Presumably, the court believed that contracts apply only to
their parties and not to the world at large, and, therefore, that such
contracts do not “stifle the free flow of ideas” in violation of copyright
policy.192
Under an appropriate preemption analysis, however, the court
should have considered whether, given the factual circumstances of
the case, the contractual prohibition on reverse engineering
threatened to lock up uncopyrightable ideas in violation of the stated
copyright policy.  While Judge Easterbrook concluded that ProCD’s
contractual price discrimination strategy could make uncopyrightable
information “more readily available,”193 the Bowers court did not indi-
cate any way in which the prohibition on reverse engineering would
facilitate access to uncopyrightable ideas.  Moreover, the Bowers court
did not consider whether there was any way that the public could gain
access to the uncopyrightable idea other than by reverse engineering
the plaintiff’s code.194  This is potentially a much different factual situ-
ation than in ProCD, where the underlying data came from telephone
directories available to anyone.195
The court should have considered the statutory purpose underly-
ing the reverse engineering exception under the First Circuit’s waiver
analysis as well.  The First Circuit and state law cases cited by Bowers
make clear that contractual waivers of statutory rights are permitted
189. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975
F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Id.  Other cases have observed that contractual restraints on reverse engineering
are contrary to copyright policy because they deprive the public of valuable innovations.
Cf. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding copyright
misuse in contract forbidding licensee from developing competing software for a 99-year
period because “Lasercomb is attempting to use its copyright in a manner adverse to the
public policy embodied in copyright law . . . .”). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Re-
straints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247 (2007).
191. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1323.
192. Id. at 1325.
193. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
194. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
195. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
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only where the statutory purpose is the protection of private property
rights rather than the public interest.  For instance, in Canal Electric
Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., a court within the First Circuit en-
forced the contractual waiver of a state breach of warranty claim.196
The court found that the warranty claim arose from the breach of
contract and was simply “an alternate theory of recovery under the
contract.”197  The court concluded that “the dispute is a purely com-
mercial one that does not affect the public interest.”198  The court
emphasized, however, that “[a] statutory right may not be disclaimed
if the waiver could ‘do violence to the public policy underlying the
legislative enactment.’”199  Thus, the court explained that there are
claims that even a business plaintiff could not waive, such as a claim
sounding in antitrust.200
The Bowers court and other courts have recognized that the pur-
pose of the fair use exception for reverse engineering is to protect the
public interest in “the free flow of ideas,” not to protect private prop-
erty rights.201  As such, the court erred in enforcing the contract with-
out making any findings to show how such a contract could be
consistent with the statutory purpose.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
As in all preemption cases, courts addressing preemption of a
contract that modifies rights under the Copyright Act must determine
whether the contract interferes with the purpose of the Act.  The pro-
posed waiver approach to contract preemption helps courts to deter-
mine which contracts interfere with copyright’s purpose and which
ones do not.  The following analysis demonstrates how courts should
apply the proposed approach to preemption and summarizes the im-
plications of the approach for a variety of cases.
A. Analysis of Shrinkwrap Licenses versus Bargained-for Contracts
Under the proposed approach to preemption, it should not mat-
ter whether the challenged contract is a bargained-for contract, a
shrinkwrap license, or other form contract.  Copyright scholars have
argued that shrinkwrap licenses and other form contracts threaten to
upset copyright law’s “delicate balance” even more than bargained-for
196. 548 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Mass. 1990).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 187 (quoting Spence v. Reeder, 416 N.E.2d 914, 924 (1981)).
200. Id. at 187–88.
201. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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contracts, and therefore should be preempted more often.202  This
argument is based on two concerns.  First, because shrinkwrap li-
censes do not require traditional forms of assent, they are less likely to
embody an actual meeting of the minds of the contracting parties.203
Second, because these licenses are used on mass-marketed products,
they threaten to displace copyright legislation more than other types
of contracts do.204
These concerns arise out of the attempt to weigh freedom to con-
tract against federal copyright policy at the wholesale level.  Judge Eas-
terbrook favors enforcing contracts and suggests that preempting
form contracts would require a return to business practices of the
“horse-and-buggy” days.205  On the other hand, commentators like
Professor Lemley and David Nimmer favor enforcing federal copy-
right policy, especially as against form contracts where evidence of
mutual assent is weaker than in bargained-for contracts.206
So long as there is sufficient evidence of assent to determine that
a contract was formed as an initial matter, however, the fact that it is a
shrinkwrap license or form contract should not be resurrected in the
contract preemption analysis.  It is possible that some contracts could
manifest so little evidence of mutual assent that their enforcement by
the state is tantamount to the enactment of mandatory copyright legis-
lation.  In those cases, courts should hold that a valid contract was
never formed, thus obviating the need to consider the contract pre-
emption issue.  This result is unlikely in the overwhelming majority of
cases, however, because current U.C.C. law is very permissive in the
ways that contracts may be formed.207
Under the proposed approach, once a court determines that the
evidence of assent is sufficient to find formation of a contract, the fact
that the contract is a form contract should play no role in the contract
preemption analysis.  This approach does not weigh the value of con-
tract enforcement against the value of federal copyright policy.  It rec-
ognizes that both values are important and shows how they can be
202. See generally supra note 24 (exploring the arguments against enforcing shrinkwrap R
licenses).
203. See Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 1287–89 (describing the problematic
results of “blanket” and “notice” assent).
204. See Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 511, 536 (1997).
205. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
206. See Lemley, Intellectual Property, supra note 1, at 1291–92 (favoring federal copyright R
law over state contract law); Nimmer et al., supra note 1, at 76 (same). R
207. See U.C.C. §§ 2-201 to -210, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/2/ (last
visited Apr. 4, 2008) (detailing the formal requirements for contract formation).
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reconciled.  Thus, it considers contract preemption on a case-by-case
basis and examines the extent to which contractual provisions conflict
with federal copyright law.
In determining whether such a conflict exists, courts should draw
from the law of contractual waivers of statutory rights.  Accordingly,
they should consider whether the copyright rules circumvented by the
contract affect only the individual contracting parties or also third
parties who are not parties to the contract.208  Assuming that there is
sufficient evidence of assent to the contract, and if the contract affects
only the individual contracting parties, then the waiver of rights will
ordinarily be permissible.  It should make no difference that the con-
tract is a form contract or how many such contracts are distributed.
On the other hand, if the contract affects third parties who are not
parties to the contract, then the waiver of rights will not ordinarily be
permissible.  In this case, it still should make no difference whether
the contract is a form contract.  The contracting parties have no right
to affect the rights of others, thus, it does not matter how much they
have bargained over and agreed to a term that would affect third
parties.
B. Analysis of Particular Contract Provisions
1. Determining Whether the Contract Clearly Waives Statutory Rights
Granted by the Copyright Act
The proposed approach to preemption first requires courts to
construe the alleged contractual waiver.  If the waiver is unclear or
ambiguous, courts should construe it not to waive statutory rights, be-
cause both contract law and federal copyright policy favor clearly
drafted contractual waivers.  If the contractual waiver is clear, courts
must determine whether the contract waives a statutory right granted
to the licensee under the Copyright Act.  If it does not, then the con-
tract is not preempted because it does not conflict with the Act.  For
instance, in National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates Inter-
national, Inc., the owner of the copyright in a computer program li-
censed National to use the program on the condition that National
would not use it to process information for third parties.209  The court
held that because the Copyright Act does not give licensees the right
to use copyrighted material for this purpose, the third-party-use re-
208. See infra Part III.B.
209. 991 F.2d 426, 427–28 (8th Cir. 1993).
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striction constituted an “extra element” in the contract claim that de-
feated preemption.210
Under the proposed approach, it is important that there is no
statutory copyright provision protecting third-party use, but not
merely because it provides an extra element beyond what is required
to show copyright infringement.  The extra-element test is not always
accurate for determining which claims conflict with federal copyright
law.211  But the absence of a statutory provision on point in National
Car Rental did tend to show that there was no conflict between the
contract and the Act.  The Copyright Act does not contain a provision
allowing use of a copyrighted work to process third-party information.
Moreover, the Act’s fair use doctrine typically does not protect com-
mercial uses that harm a copyright owner’s sales.212  Because this is
precisely the harm that National’s contract was intended to prevent,
there was no conflict.  Thus, under the proposed approach, the court
was correct in deciding that the contract should not be preempted.213
2. Determining Whether the Contract Waives Individual Rights or
Public Rights
Assuming that the contract unambiguously waives a statutory
right granted by the Copyright Act, the second question is whether
the statutory right affects only the individual parties to the contract or
other third parties as well.  If the licensee contractually waives a statu-
tory right intended as a default rule for the benefit of individual par-
ties, then the licensee’s waiver of that right ordinarily should not be
preempted.  On the other hand, if the licensee contractually waives a
statutory right intended for the benefit of third parties or the general
public, the court should preempt the contract unless there is reason
to believe that enforcing the contractual waiver will not, in the aggre-
gate, impair the purpose of the copyright provision that the contract
modifies.
To be sure, it will not always be easy to distinguish between indi-
vidual rights and public rights.  Indeed, there might be difficult cases
in which the text and history of particular provisions makes this dis-
tinction impossible.  Nevertheless, against the backdrop of categorical
210. Id. at 433.
211. See supra Part III.A.3.
212. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984)
(finding commercial or profit-making use of a copied product presumptively unfair). But
cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584–85 (1994) (stating that the com-
mercial nature of a product’s use is not conclusive but rather only one factor to be consid-
ered in a fair use analysis).
213. Nat’l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 433.
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approaches that treat contract preemption is an all-or-nothing pro-
position, the proposed approach provides a useful analytical frame-
work for determining whether a contract claim ought to be
preempted in most cases.
a. Waivers of Rights Protecting Individuals
Sometimes a contract provision circumvents a statutory provision
that seems to affect only the individual parties to the contract.  For
instance, Section 117 of the Copyright Act provides that the legitimate
owner of a copyrighted computer program may make a “copy or adap-
tation of that computer program” so long as (1) the “new copy or
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the com-
puter program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no
other manner,” or (2) the “new copy or adaptation is for archival pur-
poses only . . . .”214
This provision does not seem to create any material benefits for
third parties who would not be parties to the contract.  It does not
purport to protect copying for the purpose of reverse engineering or
disassembling object code to ascertain underlying ideas.215  Rather, it
seems to be intended for the benefit of the individual owner.  As the
court in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. noted, “Section 117 was
enacted on the recommendation of CONTU,” or the National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works.216  Con-
gress established CONTU to study and make recommendations on
computers and copyright. Sega quoted from CONTU’s Report in ex-
plaining the purpose of Section 117:
[b]ecause the placement of any copyrighted work into a
computer is the preparation of a copy [as the program is
loaded into the computer’s memory], the law should provide
that persons in rightful possession of copies of programs be
able to use them freely without fear of exposure to copyright
liability.217
214. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000).
215. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); see
O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 538 & nn.248–49 (arguing that the Sega court was correct in R
rejecting the view that Section 117 creates a right to decompile computer code); see also
Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Pro-
grams in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25, 83–85 (1993)
(criticizing an earlier case holding that Section 117 created a right to decompile).
216. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520.
217. Id. (quoting NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 1, 13 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Thus, Section 117 merely provides a default rule specifying that
the purchase of a copy of the computer program entitles the pur-
chaser to make a copy to facilitate use of the program or to make a
backup copy.  If the buyer agrees contractually to waive that right,
there is no apparent reason why the Copyright Act should preempt
enforcement of that agreement.
Another example of a doctrine arguably created for the benefit of
individual users is the first-sale doctrine.  Section 109(a) and (c) of
the Act provide that, notwithstanding the exclusive rights of distribu-
tion and public display granted to copyright owners in Section 106
(but subject to some important exceptions in Section 109(c)), an au-
thorized purchaser of a copyrighted work may resell or otherwise dis-
pose of the work, or publicly display the work as she wishes.218
The purpose of this provision is to establish a default rule specify-
ing that the right to display and the right to distribute the physical
chattel embodying the copyrighted work are included in the property
rights purchased in the work.219  Because the first-sale doctrine ordi-
narily benefits only the purchaser, the purchaser ordinarily should be
permitted to waive its protection.220  Indeed, the legislative history of
Section 109 reinforces the proposed approach on this issue.  The
House Committee Notes accompanying Section 109 make it clear that
Congress believed parties should be permitted to contract around the
first-sale doctrine.221
218. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); id. § 109(c).
219. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152
(1998) (detailing that once a copyright owner sells a copyrighted item, his statutory right
to control its distribution is exhausted).
220. It is possible that the first-sale doctrine might protect third parties in some (though
not most) cases.  For instance, a copyright owner might use a contractual limitation on
resale to prevent his own used goods from competing with his new goods.  Such a contrac-
tual limitation could foreclose competition only where the copyright owner has market
power and the good is durable both in that it may be used multiple times and in that it
does not become obsolete.  Because the proposed approach emphasizes case-by-case analy-
sis of contract preemption cases, courts are free to invalidate such a contract where it does,
in fact, affect copyright policy.  It is important to note, however, that where these require-
ments are met, the contract might also constitute copyright misuse.
221. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693.
This legislative history shows that although Congress intended to allow parties to contract
around the first-sale doctrine, it would require that such waivers be enforced through
breach of contract actions, not through copyright infringement actions.  Similarly, at this
writing, the Supreme Court is considering the ways in which a patent owner may circum-
vent patent law’s first-sale (exhaustion) doctrine in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics,
Inc.  The Government’s Brief argues that, in light of Supreme Court precedent, parties
should be able to circumvent the first-sale doctrine only by contractual agreement, and
that such agreements should be enforceable only as breach of contract claims.  Brief for
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR303.txt unknown Seq: 49 28-APR-08 7:20
664 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:616
The fair use doctrine provides a third example of a copyright pro-
vision that, in some circumstances, protects individual interests.  The
fair use doctrine permits a variety of uses of copyrighted material for a
variety of reasons.  Where a contract provision requires the licensee to
give up a right to use a copyrighted work in a way that has been
deemed a fair use under the Act, the court must determine the statu-
tory purpose in protecting that use under the fair use doctrine.  In
many cases, the fair use defense protects uses of copyrighted material
because the use benefits third parties or the public, not merely the
individual user.  In some cases, however, fair use protects individual
users of copyrighted material.  Where an individual user makes per-
sonal use of a small amount of material, transactions costs of bargain-
ing for payment are often high relative to the amount that would be
paid for the use.  Thus, fair use excuses non-payment benefiting the
individual user.  In this situation, if the individual parties are able to
overcome transactions costs and reach an agreement regarding terms
of the use, then there is no reason that the Copyright Act should pre-
empt that agreement.
b. Waivers of Rights Protecting Third Parties or the Public
There are essentially two types of contractual provisions that
might alter statutory rights intended to protect third parties who are
not parties to contract.  The first is a provision in which the copyright
owner attempts to sequester information that the Copyright Act would
leave in the public domain.  The second includes field-of-use restric-
tions that prohibit the licensee from using copyrighted material in
ways that the Copyright Act would allow.
Rights to access public domain material.  Where a contract attempts
to prevent the licensee’s access to content that is clearly not copy-
righted or copyrightable,222 the contract will be preempted unless
there is reason to believe that enforcing the individual contractual
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners 8–9, 24, Quanta Computer, Inc.
v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007) (No. 06-937).
222. Thus, as an initial matter, courts must determine whether the underlying content is
copyrighted.  If the content is clearly copyrighted, the contract does not conflict with the
purpose of the Copyright Act, regardless of whether courts think the contract terms re-
quire an “extra element” to prove breach.  Rather, such a contract simply provide the
means by which copyright owners can exercise their exclusive rights.  Accordingly, these
contracts should not be preempted.  Likewise, if the content is not clearly copyrighted or
copyrightable, but might be, the contract probably should not be preempted.  In that case,
the licensee apparently agrees to the terms of the contract in order to avoid the uncer-
tainty of the litigation process.  Because the right to avoid uncertainty is not a statutory
right granted by the Copyright Act under the first part of the waiver analysis, the contract
should not be preempted.
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waiver will not, in the aggregate, impair the purpose of the copyright
provision that the contract modifies.  In determining whether enforc-
ing the contract will impair copyright’s purpose, it is important to ob-
serve the different mechanisms licensors might employ to prevent the
licensee from using the material covered by the contract.  The con-
tract might include a flat prohibition on copying or other use.  Alter-
natively, the contract might use a price discrimination scheme under
which copying or other use is permitted at one price but prohibited at
another.  Finally, the contract might require payment for the copying
or other use.
Where a contractual provision waives a licensee’s right of access
to uncopyrighted material, there is at least an ostensible conflict be-
tween the contract and the Copyright Act.  The court then must deter-
mine whether enforcement of that waiver actually conflicts with the
Copyright Act’s purpose of keeping this content in the public domain.
Thus, enforcement of the contract will be preempted if (1) the type of
contractual provision at issue tends to limit access to this source of the
content; and (2) the facts show that the content is not readily available
elsewhere.
In ProCD, neither of these requirements for preemption was
met.223  First, price discrimination strategies of the type used in ProCD
tend to increase access.  Second, content is readily available elsewhere
in cases involving databases of telephone directories like the one in
ProCD.224
In other cases, both of these requirements are clearly met.  The
Seventh Circuit case, Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. WIREdata,
Inc.,225 provides a good example.  There, Assessment Technologies
(AT) created and copyrighted a computer program used by municipal
tax assessors to compile factual property data such as the number of
rooms in a home and age of the property.226  WIREdata asked the
municipality for the factual data, but the municipality refused on the
ground that turning over the data might breach its license agreement
with AT.227  AT then sued WIREdata for copyright infringement (pre-
sumably for contributory infringement for inducing the municipality
to infringe the copyright).228  AT argued that extracting the un-
copyrightable data would require copying either the copyrighted com-
223. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
224. Id. at 1455.
225. 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
226. Id. at 642.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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puter program or the copyrighted compilation of data as structured
by the program.229
Writing for the court, Judge Posner expressed doubt that turning
over the uncopyrightable data would require copying any of AT’s
copyrighted material.230  He concluded, however, that “AT would lose
this copyright case even if the raw data . . . could not be extracted
without making a copy of the program,” because such “intermediate
copying” constitutes fair use.231  In reaching this decision, he empha-
sized that much of the data would not be available elsewhere.  The
existence of AT’s program had caused many assessors to stop record-
ing the data by hand.  As a result, for many properties the data could
not be obtained except by extracting it from AT’s copyrighted
compilation.232
Furthermore, Judge Posner asserted that if AT’s license agree-
ment were read to prevent the municipality from turning over public
domain data, AT might have committed copyright misuse.  He ex-
plained that “[t]o try by contract or otherwise to prevent the munici-
palities from revealing their own data, especially when, as we have seen,
the complete data are unavailable anywhere else, might constitute
copyright misuse.”233  Thus, the court suggests that it might be copy-
right misuse to use a contract to obtain rights beyond the rights that
copyright law provides, even where there would be no antitrust
violation.234
The court did not address the issue of whether such a contract
would be preempted if AT tried to enforce it.  AT did not sue
WIREdata for breach of contract, because WIREdata was not a party to
the contract between AT and the municipality.  Thus, the court simply
noted that “it is irrelevant that ProCD . . . holds that a copyright owner
can by contract limit copying beyond the right that a copyright
confers.”235
If AT did attempt to enforce the contract against the municipal-
ity, however, the contract should be preempted, notwithstanding
ProCD.  Here, unlike in ProCD, enforcement of the contract would im-
pair the policy of keeping uncopyrightable data in the public domain.
First, AT’s outright prohibition on copying uncopyrightable data
229. Id. at 643–45.
230. See id. at 643–44 (describing two easy methods of extracting raw data, which is in
the public domain and therefore uncopyrightable, from the Market Drive program).
231. Id. at 644–45.
232. Id. at 645.
233. Id. at 646–47.
234. Id. at 647.
235. Id. at 646.
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would obviously decrease access to the particular source of informa-
tion at issue in the case.  Second, the data are clearly unavailable from
other sources because the plaintiff controls the only source of the
information.
Thus, contracts like the one in ProCD should not be preempted,
while contracts like the one in Assessment Technologies should be.
Other cases are less clear.  For instance, in Bowers, the flat prohibition
on reverse engineering to access uncopyrightable ideas underlying
the program seems, on its face, to decrease access to public domain
ideas.236  It is unknown whether the ideas underlying the computer
code in Bowers were readily available elsewhere, however, because the
court made no findings on the issue.
Because the question here is whether enforcement of this type of
contract will impair the policy behind the statutory provision, there
might be a sliding scale between these two elements.  In ProCD, be-
cause the factual information was readily available to other potential
database compilers, the fact that the price discrimination strategy ei-
ther increased access or decreased access very little meant that the
contract was not preempted.237  By contrast, the fact that the Assess-
ment Technologies data were not available from anywhere else, plus the
fact that the contract prohibited all sharing of that information,
means that the contract ought to be preempted.238  Although Judge
Posner suggested that AT’s conduct might constitute misuse,239 the
preemption remedy would still be important as a defense to a breach
of contract action. Bowers would be a harder case.  The contract was
an outright prohibition on reverse engineering, which favors preemp-
tion.240  However, because the court made no findings on the issue, it
is unclear whether the underlying ideas that would have been discov-
ered through reverse engineering could be obtained readily else-
where.  If the plaintiff in Bowers had the power to exclude others from
the program’s underlying ideas, that finding would be sufficient,
though probably not necessary, to tip the scales in favor of
preemption.
Rights to use copyrighted material.  A somewhat different type of con-
tractual provision, a field-of-use restriction, limits the licensee’s ability
to use copyrighted material in ways that the Copyright Act would per-
mit.  For instance, the fair use defense protects certain uses of copy-
236. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
237. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).
238. Assessment Techs., 350 F.3d at 646–47.
239. Id.
240. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1326.
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righted material because the uses benefit others beyond the individual
user.  These uses, which have been called “transformative” or “produc-
tive” uses, include uses for comment or criticism, news reporting, re-
search, and educational purposes.  The right to engage in such uses is
protected not solely for the benefit of the individual user, but for the
benefit of the general public.241
Thus, like contractual waivers of the right to use public domain
material, contractual waivers of the fair use right to engage in trans-
formative uses of copyrighted material are in apparent conflict with
federal copyright law.  Accordingly, the court should preempt en-
forcement of such a contractual provision unless it determines that
enforcing individual waivers will somehow serve copyright policy in
the aggregate.
It is unlikely, however, that there will be many situations in which
enforcing waivers of this right will serve copyright policy.  For in-
stance, while a price discrimination strategy might actually increase
access to public domain material, it is unlikely that such a strategy will
enhance transformative uses of copyrighted material.  If a copyright
owner can prohibit parodies or reviews of her work at one price and
permit them at another price, she can effectively control criticism of
her work.  Yet, encouraging such criticism and comment is at the
heart of the fair use doctrine’s protection of transformative uses.
And, clearly, if a price discrimination strategy does not promote trans-
formative uses, neither do outright prohibitions or requirements to
pay for the use.
V. CONCLUSION
For years, courts and scholars have been debating whether the
Copyright Act should preempt breach of contract claims.  Some
courts have taken the categorical position that because contracts af-
fect only their parties, they do not create exclusive rights that supplant
copyright infringement actions.  Moreover, they emphasize the impor-
tance of allowing parties to decide for themselves how best to allocate
copyrights.  On the other hand, copyright scholars have argued, al-
most as categorically, that federal copyright policy should preempt
contracts whose terms differ from those of the Copyright Act.  Yet,
these scholars have also acknowledged that copyright must allow room
for freedom to contract, and that contract claims are different from
copyright infringement claims in important ways.  Neither of these
241. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. R
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categorical approaches to contract preemption allows courts to con-
sider how some contracts affect copyright policy while others do not.
Because the touchstone of preemption doctrine is statutory pur-
pose, it requires courts to consider each claim individually to deter-
mine whether it interferes with that purpose.  The existing
approaches to copyright preemption of contracts do not address, on a
case-by-case basis, whether individual contracts impair copyright’s stat-
utory purpose. Thus, copyright law has failed to develop a coherent
account of contract preemption that harmonizes the individual inter-
est in freedom of contract and the societal interest in federal copy-
right policy.
This Article argues that existing approaches to copyright preemp-
tion of contracts fail, in part, because preemption doctrine is not well-
suited to contract claims.  Technically, contracts affecting rights under
the Copyright Act present a preemption issue because private con-
tracts depend on state law for enforcement.  But unlike in most pre-
emption cases, the issue in contract preemption cases is not really
whether a state regulatory scheme is likely to supplant a federal
scheme.  Rather, the issue is whether individuals should be able to
contract away rights granted by the federal Copyright Act.
Accordingly, courts should look to the law governing contractual
waivers of statutory rights for guidance in determining when parties
should be permitted to contract around the Copyright Act.  Waiver
law holds that contractual waivers of statutory rights are permissible
where (1) the waiver is clear and unmistakable, and (2) the licensee
waives a statutory right that is intended for the protection of individu-
als who are parties to the contract rather than third parties or the
general public who are not parties to the contract.
These waiver requirements help to reconcile the interests in free-
dom of contract with the interests in enforcing federal copyright pol-
icy.  The first requirement keeps federal copyright law in place until a
party clearly intends to waive one of her rights.  The second require-
ment guides courts in determining when a contract provision is truly
an obstacle to the purpose of a provision of the Copyright Act.  Where
the contract modifies a statutory right that merely sets a default rule
for the benefit of individual parties, those parties should be free to
decide that a different rule serves them better.  Accordingly, such a
contractual waiver is ordinarily not an obstacle to the purpose of copy-
right law.  On the other hand, where the contract modifies a statutory
right intended to benefit numerous parties, the contract potentially
conflicts with the purpose of copyright law.  Even here, however, it will
sometimes be possible that enforcing such individual waivers will
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somehow effectuate statutory purpose in the aggregate.  Thus, waiver
analysis indicates where there is prima facie a conflict between enforce-
ment of a contract and federal copyright law, but holds that the ulti-
mate touchstone is still whether the contract interferes with the
purpose of federal copyright law.
The proposed approach has some important implications.  First,
it rejects a good deal of scholarship arguing that shrinkwrap licenses
and other form contracts should be preempted more often than bar-
gained-for contracts.  Once a court determines that the evidence of
assent is sufficient to find formation of a contract, the fact that the
contract is a form contract should play no role in the contract pre-
emption analysis.  Under this approach, if the contract affects only the
individual contracting parties, then a waiver of rights is permissible.  It
makes no difference that the contract is a form contract or how many
such contracts are distributed.  On the other hand, if the contract af-
fects third parties who are not parties to the contract, then a waiver of
rights is not permissible.  In this case, it still makes no difference
whether the contract is a form contract.  The contracting parties have
no right to affects the rights of others, so it does not matter how much
they have bargained over and agreed to a term that would affect third
parties.
Second, the proposed approach provides a framework to help
courts determine whether individual contracts interfere with copy-
right policy.  This approach directs courts to separate contractual
waivers of individual statutory rights from waivers of third-party statu-
tory rights, and concludes that waivers of individual rights should not
be preempted.  Thus, waivers of rights to make back-up copies of com-
puter programs or first-sale rights to resell a copy of a copyrighted
work ordinarily should be enforceable.  With regard to contractual
waivers of rights benefiting third-parties, the issue is more complex.
These rights include the right to use public domain material as well as
the right to make transformative fair uses of copyrighted materials.
The waiver approach shows that these contracts are in apparent con-
flict with the purpose of the Copyright Act, but requires courts to con-
sider whether there is any reason to believe that enforcement of
individual waivers could be consistent with statutory purpose on the
whole.  For instance, because some price discrimination strategies re-
quiring waiver of the right to use public domain materials at a given
price might actually increase overall access to those materials, they
should not be preempted.
In conclusion, the proposed waiver approach helps courts to de-
termine when individual contracts interfere with federal copyright
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policy.  By keeping statutory purpose at the forefront of preemption
analysis, it provides a coherent approach to copyright preemption of
contracts that balances the interests in freedom of contract with the
interests in enforcing federal copyright policy.
